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Abstract 
This paper studies the effects superiorly informed market makers have on the price 
formation process. Two models are developed in which the market maker receives some 
informative signal. In one version, the market maker receives an informative signal at the 
start of the day with which he assigns a probability to its correctness. In the other version, 
the market maker receives a fully informative signal at some random time throughout the 
day. By comparing the models to the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, it is shown that 
informed market makers are able to improve certain dimensions of market quality. Prices 
become more reflective of their true value, price discovery is enhanced, and trading costs 
for uninformed traders are decreased. These benefits to the market are further demonstrated 
through the development of simulations of the theoretical models. 
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1. IntroductionEquation Chapter 1 Section 1
 
The idea that market makers may have superior information on the fundamentals of 
security prices has received little attention in previous literature, drawing  on the common 
assumption that they are symmetrically uninformed with the rest of the market, ever since 
papers such as Bagehot (1971) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). More recently, however, 
this concept has begun to be criticised with the advent of empirical research reporting trade 
behaviour by market makers that can be associated with information asymmetries.  
 
Behaviour such as price leadership and dissemination of information through quotes has 
been found in various market maker markets, including the Foreign Exchange market (FX 
market) and Nasdaq. Peiers (1997) and Sapp (2002) found that certain banks, who were 
acting as market intermediaries on the FX market were able to incorporate new information 
into prices before public announcements were made. Also Huang (2002) and Heidle and Li 
(2005) presented evidence that certain dealers on Nasdaq were able to quote more 
aggressive bid (ask) prices before the public release of positive (negative) information, 
suggesting they were superiorly informed through this quote signalling. 
 
It is therefore of interest to market microstructure practitioners and policy makers to 
consider the possibility that marker makers may be asymmetrically informed with 
uninformed traders in the market. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the consequences of 
this in terms of market efficiency. To analyse these effects in a general setting, a theoretical 
model would need to be developed. Previous models by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle 
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(1985), and Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), amongst many others,1 cannot account for 
informed market makers since they assume the market makers are symmetrically 
uninformed. These models differ in that they show the adjustment of prices under certain 
types of trader orders such as limit orders, stop orders, short selling restrictions and 
differing traded volumes. 
 
This paper, therefore, represents a divergence from the norm of analysing a model with 
respect to differing trade orders, introducing an approach in which the costs of trading by 
uninformed traders can be reduced. The idea is now solidly proposed that an informed 
market maker is beneficial for the market. 
 
The approach presented herein is the first to model formally the effects of a single market 
maker receiving signals regarding the fundamental value of an asset on the process of 
various dynamics of market efficiency. This is achieved through the development of 
sequential trade models that describe how the market maker amends his bid and ask prices, 
given a certain sequence of trades and signals. Sequential trade models have been used ever 
since Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and are used in preference to strategic trade models, 
such as that of Kyle (1985), since the strategic models do not allow for the examination of 
the dynamics of bid and ask prices, which is one of the main focuses of this paper. 
 
In this paper, the analysis of these price movements, therefore, allows conclusions to be 
drawn concerning price dynamics, such as the width of the spread and the adjustment 
process by which prices converge to their full informational values. These conclusions are 
                                                 
1 Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992a, 1992b) for example. 
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then verified through simulations of the models that yield important implications regarding 
issues such as market performance and market design. 
 
Several significant findings emerge from the propositions put forward in this paper and 
from these simulations. Firstly, it is found that informed market makers are able to subject 
themselves to increased trade by informed traders, which would justify the inclusion of 
informed market makers in markets that are heavily populated with informed traders, such 
as option and futures markets, and also in markets with small-cap stocks. Secondly, the 
analysis shows that if a market maker is able to receive any type of informative signal, then 
the average spread in the market will be reduced in proportion to the quality of information 
contained in the received signal. This reduction of spreads actually reflects the reduction of 
an ‘adverse selection risk premium’ that the market maker incorporates into his spread.  
 
This premium is designed to balance losses made from informed trades by gains made from 
uninformed trades. The reduction of this premium means that uninformed traders can 
optimise their trading strategies. This is further analysed in Section 4. Finally, the analysis 
presented in this paper shows that  the market maker is able to quote more accurately, and, 
therefore, enhance price discovery in the market, without significantly increasing the 
volatility in the market, which is contrary to the common belief that price efficiency and 
volatility is a trade-off that policy makers must consider when optimising market structure. 
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1.1 Further Motivation 
 
The concept that adverse selection can enhance spreads is not a new idea. This idea has 
been studied extensively in the past by authors such as Demsetz (1968), Bagehot (1971), 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992a, 1992b). What is not 
well understood, however, is exactly how well the market maker can reduce these spreads 
by becoming somewhat less asymmetrically informed. He2 may achieve this through the 
receipt of a signal with a certain correctness. It is also not understood how the learning 
process is then advanced through informative signals either. This paper addresses these and 
broader issues, such as the overall welfare of market participants when a market maker is 
less subject to informed trading. This is achieved through the development of information-
based models.  
 
The development of a model to provide analysis on this issue is required for several 
reasons. First and foremost, there are gaps in the literature, which at present mostly 
concentrates on issues such as market welfare effects due to uninformed market makers, 
and competitive effects on symmetrically informed market makers. To date there has been 
no research undertaken that focuses on the overall market welfare effects of a market maker 
who is partially informed, and moreover that differentiates explicitly these effects from 
those occurring in the case in which he is uninformed. Therefore, the examination of this 
topic of research is interesting because it enhances the understanding of the impact of 
market microstructure on important issues such as price discovery, price stability and 
                                                 
2 Throughout the remainder of this paper, the use of the masculine, such as ‘he’ or ‘him’ refers either to the 
masculine or the feminine.  
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market efficiency. These dynamics are all qualities that any market should aspire to achieve 
in order to increase the overall welfare of all market participants. 
 
The models developed to explore these issues allow for the interaction of repeat trading and 
price adjustment, and, therefore, can incorporate the role of signals in a dynamic 
framework, which allows for the characterisation of price paths and the setting of spreads 
by the market maker. It is, therefore, the belief of the author that the advanced modelling 
approach developed here will be useful for analysing a wide variety of issues related to the 
research of market microstructure. 
 
This paper develops two unique models. The first analyses the case in which the market 
maker receives information about a traded asset once at the beginning of the day with a 
certain correctness. The second examines the case in which the market maker uncovers the 
full information value about that traded asset at some point in time during the day. The 
results found under these two cases can solve several questions that remain unanswered by 
previous literature. Firstly, what features, either employed by the exchange or market 
maker, aid the market maker’s ability to assess the true value of the asset? That is, should 
an exchange provide unique access to order flow to the market maker, or should the market 
maker endeavour to gain this information by his own analysis? Since efficiency in a market 
is highly dependent upon this particular learning process, understanding these features may 
provide insight into the process by which prices become efficient, and, therefore, provide 
researchers with a fresh understanding of the facilitation of price discovery by market 
makers.  
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The second question concerns delineating the link between the proportion of informed 
trading and the stability of prices and performance of a market. As Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) have noted, if adverse selection risk becomes too severe, then there will not exist 
any market clearing price at which trades can occur. This problem arises because a high 
enough threat of information-based trading may induce many or all uninformed traders out 
of the market, resulting in a sure loss to any trader who is on the other side of an informed 
trade. Thus, with no price able to clear the market, the only option would be a trading halt 
in which the market ceases to function. Hence, one possible solution to this problem lies in 
the market maker becoming informed. If there is some aspect to his learning that alleviates 
the pricing problem that has been induced by asymmetric information, then the market may 
be more robust than a simple asymmetric informational analysis would imply.   
 
The analysis performed in this paper shows that a market maker who is less asymmetrically 
informed to the informed traders, will then be able to subject himself to a higher proportion 
of informed trading in the market that would reduce the possibility of a trading halt and also 
provide extra stability in prices. It is easy to see the benefits of this for the welfare of the 
market in general; however, it is also beneficial from the market maker’s standpoint. 
Although the issue of inventory costs to the market maker is not explored in this paper, the 
results presented herein demonstrate that the market maker will now be less dependent on 
order flow when setting his quotes. This suggests that the market maker will be less prone 
to inventory risk, and, thus, not have to rebalance his inventory frequently, which implies 
that he would be more willing to take larger positions and hold them for longer than would 
his uninformed counterparts.  
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Hence, the results found in the present study will be of interest to several groups of 
practitioners. Firstly, the growing popularity of the concept of informed market makers is 
an attractive topic to market microstructure researchers as it is a topic previously 
unexplored, which provides a plethora of avenues to investigate, such as effects on spreads, 
price efficiency, strategic behaviour and, more generally, market welfare. Regulators as 
well will be interested since the results concern issues often discussed by the policy makers 
that promote fairness and welfare in a market. For example, since it is a common belief that 
markets should promote the private interests of utilitarian traders, the presence of an 
informed market maker will make markets more desirable to trade in for these traders by 
providing decreased width of spreads and enhancement of price discovery. Finally, these 
results are of interest to market makers themselves. Risk-management is a significant part 
of any market making role, since they are often exposed to very large positions. Therefore, 
the models presented may provide existing uninformed market makers with an incentive to 
become informed in order to manage their risk more fluently. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature in 
the area of related models and provides evidence for informative marked makers. Section 3 
formally presents the two models developed, and Section 4 compares the models to the 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model that assumed market makers to be uninformed. Section 
5 demonstrates the robustness of the propositions put forward in Section 4 through 
simulations of the model. Section 6 then provides discussion on the implications of the 
results, offering insight into extensions and further testing of the model. Section 7 
concludes the paper.   
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2. Related Literature / BackgroundEquation Chapter 2 Section 1
 
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with an understanding, firstly, of the 
risks that uninformed market makers and other uninformed traders face in securities 
markets. The second part of this section analyses the ways in which previous literature has 
modelled how market makers respond to these risks given certain dynamics of trade. The 
final section then explores the concept of an informed market maker and analyses the ways 
in which he may become informed. 
 
2.1 The Adverse Selection Problem 
 
An increasingly preeminent topic in market microstructure research concentrates on the 
effects of asymmetric information in securities markets and the associated welfare of 
market participants. The adverse selection problem, brought about by asymmetric 
information-induced trading, arises when there is a possibility of being counterparty to a 
superiorly informed trader. This follows from the fact that the current price of the security 
trading in the market does not reflect its full information price, which occurs when the 
market fails to be strong-form efficient. In such cases, there will be certain regularities to an 
informed trader’s behaviour.  
 
The first of these is that an informed trader will only trade in the direction of the pricing 
discrepancy. That is, the informed will only submit buy orders if the security is underpriced 
and conversely, only submit sell orders if it is overpriced. This ensures a positive profit that 
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is determined by the price differential. Other regularities include the preference to trade a 
larger amount to maximise trading profits, and to continue trading until prices converge to 
their full informative value. The consequences of these regularities on other market 
participants are described below. 
 
2.1.1 Effects on Market Makers3 
Given that trading is a zero-sum game, being counterparty to an informed trader will result 
in a trading loss equal to the trading profit of that informed trader. Thus the nature of the 
adverse selection problem becomes quite significant for market makers, who are well aware 
of these potential trading losses from trading with an informed trader. The specification of 
the solution to the market maker to mitigate this possibility has formed the basis of a 
considerable number of empirical and theoretical research articles. A common finding in 
previous research is that it is this risk of trading with an informed trader that the market 
maker uses to justify widening his bid-ask spread, thus incorporating an adverse selection 
risk premium into his prices. 
 
The origin of the bid-ask spread has been determined from the perspective of the market 
maker with respect to several factors such as inventory costs, transaction costs and adverse 
selection costs. The seminal paper of Demsetz (1968) was the first to break down 
theoretically the bid-ask spread into specific components such as transaction costs and 
inventory costs to the market maker. This was subsequently also examined by authors 
                                                 
3 Note that throughout this paper, reference is made to any market participant who is designated to provide 
liquidity to the market as a market maker. Such reference enables examination of specialists, dealers and other 
market makers who are required to post bid and ask quotes on their specific market. However the scope of 
this paper is confined to monopolist market makers. 
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Glosten (1987), Glosten and Harris (1988), Stoll (1989). However, the idea that adverse 
selection induced by asymmetric information is a sufficient determinant to produce a 
positive bid-ask spread was first logically examined by Bagehot (1971), and then more 
theoretically by Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and several other 
authors.4 This approach in analysing the bid-ask spread was quite fundamental as stated by 
O’Hara (1995): 
 
‘That the bid-ask spread reflects a balancing of losses to the informed with 
gains from the uninformed represented a fundamental insight into the nature 
of market making. While, undoubtedly, inventory and transaction costs are 
important factors, the notion that information costs also affect prices 
provided a new and important direction for market structure research. 
Perhaps most significant, it provided a way to explain market bid-ask spread 
behaviour without relying on exogenous technological specifications of 
transaction costs.’ 
 
It was Bagehot’s (1971) conclusion that any uninformed trader who traded in opposition to 
an informed trader would incur more losses on average through his trading than otherwise. 
For the average investor, the implication of this scenario is the loss of money relative to the 
neutral market rate of return over time. In the author’s reasoning the market intermediary, 
or the market maker, who is required to provide liquidity to the market by quoting a bid-ask 
spread, is presumed to understand this concept of losses due to the presence of informed 
traders. Thus, to remain solvent, it is the market maker’s aim to balance the losses from 
                                                 
4 See Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Easley and O’Hara (1987; 1991; 1992a; 1992b)  
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trading by informed traders with gains from trading by uninformed traders through the 
formation of a positive bid-ask spread. Using this logic, it can be determined that the 
adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask spread is an increasing function of the 
proportion of informed trading in the market and hence the market maker’s decision 
problem can be formulated in a world of asymmetric information. 
 
2.1.2 Effects on Uninformed Traders5 
The bid-ask spread reflects a fundamental element of the implicit cost of trading by all 
traders. It reflects the loss on an instantaneous round-trip trade. It is hence through this 
notion of losses due to a bid-ask spread that examination of the effects on uninformed 
traders is performed. 
 
Firstly, consideration of the set of all uninformed traders as a single uninformed trader 
allows the possibility that such an uninformed trader will simultaneously buy and sell, and 
thus incur a trading loss of the bid-ask spread at any one point in time. Consideration is also 
given to uninformed traders who have a clearly defined utilitarian non-profit motivation to 
trade, and that such traders will maximise their utility by optimising their order submission 
strategies.   
 
Thus the strategies of uninformed traders become sub-optimal when the cost, either explicit 
or implicit, of their trading increases. As stated previously, if a market maker widens his 
spread to compensate possible losses generated by trading with an informed trader, then 
                                                 
5 Throughout the remainder of this paper, uninformed traders are deemed to be utilitarian traders whose 
motives to trade may include investing, borrowing, hedging, entertainment or fledgling purposes. 
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effectively the market maker is, in this way, passing on the adverse selection risk onto the 
uninformed traders by increasing their implicit cost of trading. That is, the uninformed 
traders will now have to pay a premium to place their order submission strategies. If the 
premium is too costly to bear then it can force utilitarian traders from the market. This 
situation, a variant of the market-for-lemons problem first identified by Akerlof (1970), 
identifies market failure.  
 
The increased spread is not the only increased cost utilitarian traders will need to take into 
account; there are also other implicit trading costs such as increased market impact due to 
decreased depth, increased execution uncertainty and also ex-post regret. However, the bid-
ask spread is the most significant of these and is the most commonly accepted proxy for the 
implicit cost of trading by uninformed traders (Keim and Madhavan, 1997). Therefore this 
paper adopts the approach taken by many authors previously to estimate the dynamics of 
the bid-ask spread when there is a positive proportion of informed traders in the market, 
and that is through the dynamics of a sequential trade model.  
 
Another modelling approach taken to examine the effects of the bid-ask spread with the 
existence of informed traders is known as strategic trader modelling, which commenced 
with Kyle (1985). These models feature a single informed agent who can trade at multiple 
times. While an individual trader only participates in the market once (as in the sequential 
trade models), there is no need for the informed trader to take into account the effect his 
actions might have on the subsequent decisions of others. A trader who revisits the market, 
however, must make such calculations, and they involve considerations of a strategy. Since 
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the focus of this paper is not on the strategies of informed traders, the sequential trade 
model is accepted instead. 
 
2.2 Sequential Trade Models 
 
2.2.1 Copeland and Galai (1983) 
Copeland and Galai (1983) were the first to model formally the pricing schedule of a 
market maker given a certain proportion of informed traders existing in the market. The 
authors’ approach proved that the size and the placement of the market maker’s bid and ask 
prices are largely determined from the expected gains and losses incurred through trading. 
The approach assumes a single risk-neutral market maker who sets bid and ask prices in a 
one-period model to maximise expected profit according to an objective function that seeks 
to balance expected losses from informed traders with expected gains from uninformed 
traders. 
 
In this model, the true underlying price of the security, S, is drawn from a known, pre-
specified stochastic process, f (S), which is exogenous to the market and known to all 
market participants. The informed traders (with proportion Ip ) are the only traders to know 
the true value of the security at any one given point in time. The remaining traders are 
deemed uninformed (with proportion 1L Ip p= − ) and have a liquidity motivated reason to 
trade, independent of other events in the market. All traders arrive at the market 
anonymously and they transact at fixed, predetermined amounts using market orders. The 
market maker is risk-neutral and his objective is to set a spread to maximise expected 
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profit. The liquidity traders also have price-elastic demand functions, giving them the 
option to trade, thus the size of the bid-ask spread becomes important in the price-setting 
process. That is, if the market maker sets a bid-ask spread that is too wide, then his losses 
from informed trading will decrease, but his gains from uninformed trading will also be 
reduced. Conversely, if he sets the spread too thin, then he becomes subject to greater 
losses from informed trading, but greater gains from the liquidity trading. 
 
Given this structure, the market maker first calculates his expected loss to an informed 
trader as the following integral: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
B
A
P
I A BP
p S P f S S P S f S S
∞⎡ ⎤− ∂ + − ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  (2.1) 
 
where Ask Price, Bid PriceA BP P= =  
 
His expected gain to a liquidity trader is similarly as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 01 .0I BL A SL B NLp p P S p S P p− − + − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (2.2) 
 
where  Probability of a buy from a liquidity trader
 Probability of a sell from a liquidity trader
 Probability of a no-trade from a liquidity trader
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p
p
=
=
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Hence, the dealer’s decision problem to set a bid and ask price is solved by maximising the 
difference between the expected revenue and loss functions; that is, between equations (2.2) 
and (2.1): 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) }, 0 00
max 1
0
A B
B
A
P P I BL A SL B
P
I A BP
p p P S p S P
p S P f S S P S f S S
∞
− − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − ∂ + − ∂ ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫
 (2.3) 
 
Hence, this model can be seen to be the first to solve the dealer’s price-setting problem as a 
function of asymmetric information. This implies that as long as there is a positive 
probability that a proportion of the traders are informed, then the spread will never reduce 
to zero. This existing framework shows that asymmetric information alone is a sufficient 
determinant to induce a positive bid-ask spread. However, such intuition breaks down when 
repeated trades are allowed, implying that the nature of the order flow is now dependent 
upon the dealer’s pricing problem.  
 
2.2.2 Glosten-Milgrom (1985) Model 
The Copeland and Galai (1983) model assumes a one-period model in which the true value 
of the security is realised after a trade. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (hereafter referred to as 
GM) extend this model, in which they examine multiple rounds of trading where the true 
value is only known after some certain trading interval. Therefore, the amount that is lost 
due to trading by the informed cannot be so easily determined. Thus the size of this loss in 
this model will depend not only on the current bid and ask pricing schedule set by the 
market maker, but also on how quickly the prices will converge to the true value. Hence, 
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the market maker now needs to consider the possibility that recently transacted trades can 
be considered as signals conveying information. 
 
The interesting aspect of this model is the realisation that past trades can contain 
information about the true value, which can affect the behaviour of the market maker’s 
pricing schedule. This pertains to the fact that the informed traders reflect their information 
through the direction of their trades. As stated previously, the informed will only place buy 
orders if they know the security to be underpriced and sell orders if they know the security 
to be overpriced. The market maker can use this information progressively to determine the 
realisation of the true value of the security. What he now needs to consider is that the 
realisation of the true value can be impaired by the trading of uninformed traders, who trade 
for reasons exogenous to the price currently observed in the market. Hence, the market 
maker must account for this and does so by updating his beliefs about the true value, 
conditional upon the type of trade that occurred. This model thus addresses how 
information is incorporated into market price. 
 
Figure 1 describes the process of trade.6 Similar to Copeland and Galai (1983), GM define 
a market in which there is one security traded with a random value, V , where the true state 
of this value is determined before market open and can be one of two values: high or low, 
V or V . The market maker knows this will occur with a certain probability, and knows the 
proportion of informed to uninformed traders in the market. The type of trader is chosen at 
random, and his identity is unknown to the market maker. However, the market maker 
                                                 
6 See Table 1 in Section 3 for a summary of the notation used for this and further models. 
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knows that if the true value is high, ( )i.e. V V= , and an informed trader is chosen, then that 
trader will always buy. Similarly if the true value is low, ( )i.e. V V= , then the chosen 
informed trader will always sell. The uninformed trader, on the other hand, trades for a 
liquidity-motivated reason and may either buy or sell independent of V  with a specific 
probability. It is also important to note that there is no explicit cost to executing a trade in 
this model.7 Thus, so long as there exists a positive proportion of informed traders in the 
market, the probability the market maker will attach to a high value conditional on a buy 
will be greater than the probability of a low value conditional on a buy. Similarly, the 
probability of a low value conditional on a sell will be greater than the probability of a high 
value conditional on a sell. Mathematically, 
 
 ( ) ( )Pr Buy Pr Buyt tV V V V= > =  (2.4) 
 
and  
 ( ) ( )Pr Sell Pr SellV V V V= > =  (2.5) 
 
Moreover,  
 ( ) ( )Pr Buy Pr Sell  
 t
V V V V
positive if V V
negative if V V
= = ⎧ =− = ⎨ =⎩
 (2.6) 
 
                                                 
7 However, Glosten and Milgrom (1985, p. 83) discuss the development of the model to include fixed 
transaction costs. The difference between the two models is affected through the serial correlation of the first 
differences of the transaction price process. Please see the original paper for extra clarification of this 
difference. 
 23 
 
Figure 1 GM Tree Diagram Describing Operation of the Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tree diagram describing the process in which a trade is executed with a market maker, whereθ  is the 
probability of a high value of V occurring, μ  is the probability that a trade originates from an 
informed trader, γ is the probability that an uninformed trader is a buyer. Nodes to the left of the 
dotted line occur only at the beginning of the trading day; nodes to the right are repeated during the 
trading interval. 
 
The market maker will now revise his bid and ask quotes through a Bayesian updating 
process of his expectations about the true value given a certain realisation of trade.8 Since 
he is risk-neutral and competitive, he specifically sets his prices such that the expected 
profit on any trade is zero. Thus his pricing schedule will reflect his conditional expectation 
on the security’s value at any given point in time. Due to this, his prices are ‘regret-free’, in 
                                                 
8 Appendix A.1 contains a brief introduction to Bayes’ rule and its application in the dynamic pricing 
schedule of the market maker. Please see this appendix for further information on this theorem. 
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the sense that given any following trade (a buy or a sell), the market maker will not regret 
trading as his quote reflected the belief that the price was fair. Hence, his bid price is his 
expectation of the true value of the security at which someone might buy from him, and 
similarly his ask is his expectation of the true value of the security at which someone might 
sell to him. That is,9 
 
 ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1
1 1
Ask Buy
Pr Buy Pr Buy
1 1 1
1 1 1
GM
t t
t t
E V
V V V V
V Vθ μ μ γ θ μ γ
θ μ μ γ θ μ
+
+ +
= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= +
+ − + − −= + − + − −
 (2.7) 
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Bid Sell
Pr Sell Pr Sell
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
GM
t t
t t
E V
V V V V
V Vθ μ γ θ μ μ γ
θ μ γ θ μ μ γ
+
+ +
= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= +
− − + − + − −= − − + − + − −
 (2.8) 
 
Where the spread is defined as: 
 
 Spread Ask BidGM GM GMt t t= −  (2.9) 
 
                                                 
9 Note that the probability of the event V V Ω= occurring is denoted as V Ω throughout the remainder of this 
paper, where { },V V VΩ ∈ . 
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The marker maker then updates his quotes by substituting his prior probability of the true 
value, conditional upon the recent trade direction, into his posterior probability of the true 
value. Since he knows the probabilities of informed and uninformed actions, the market 
maker can progressively learn about the true value given a sequence of actions. He 
continues to quote until he has sufficiently learned the true value of the security after a 
certain sequence of trades.  
 
The characteristic of this process is thus a simple application of Bayes’ rule by the market 
maker. As noted in Appendix A.6, the convergence to the true value depends on the number 
of buys and sells that the market maker has observed in the market. Considering only the 
high value of V , convergence will occur when the probability that V V=  conditional upon 
b number of buys and s number of sells approaches 1 in the limit. That is:
( )lim Pr , 1.
b s
V V b s a s+ →∞ = JJJG . 
 
Thus, the central result of the GM model is that the bid-ask spread can arise due to 
asymmetric information in the market. Several variations on this model exist, as discussed 
below, that seek to demonstrate that other market phenomena can explain the presence of 
asymmetric information and as a result generate a positive bid-ask spread. 
 
2.2.3 Other Sequential Trade Models  
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) examine the effects of short sale constraints and how these 
constraints affect the propensity to trade and, accordingly, if this influences the speed of 
convergence to the true value. In their analysis, they consider the possibility that a trader 
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will come to the market and be in a position in which he will be unable to trade because of 
these constraints.  
 
The authors then employ a method known as the ‘first time passage approach’ to measure 
the time it takes for the market maker to adjust his belief about the true value. This 
approach, the first in market microstructure literature for computing a direct measure of 
adjustment speed, involves calculating the number of trading intervals before the market 
maker’s quotes crosses a predetermined price threshold. The authors then illustrate that 
introducing short sale constraints hinders the convergence process of prices to private 
information, especially to negative news.  
 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) consider the ability of traders to trade two possible order sizes, 
small and large. The authors found that the market maker will set two different sets of bid 
and ask quotes for each different order size. The interesting feature of this model is that 
because the informed is allowed to select among different order sizes, the price equilibrium 
now differs to that of the GM model. In particular, two different equilibria occur: (1) in 
which the informed choose only to trade large quantities, known as the separating 
equilibrium; and (2) in which the informed could choose either a large or a small quantity 
and, thus, pool themselves with the uninformed, known as the pooling equilibrium. Thus, 
using this simple sequential trade model, Easley and O’Hara (1987) introduce a new 
complexity into the analysis of asymmetric information.10  
 
                                                 
10 Other models include Easley and O’Hara (1991) which considers a market that accepts stop orders and also 
Easley and O’Hara (1992b) which looks at event uncertainty. 
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A common underlying feature of the aforementioned models is that there is no provision for 
the arrival of non-trade information given to the market maker during trading. These 
models assume the only information he can infer about the realisation of value is with 
respect to transaction history and the market allowance for different types of orders. Even 
with such additional extra market mechanisms, the uninformed traders still exhibit 
significant implicit costs to trading as their orders are ultimately pooled alongside informed 
traders.  
 
2.3 Informed Market Makers 
 
The aforementioned models state that the information asymmetries faced by the market 
maker will be sufficient to induce a positive bid-ask spread. This means that if the adverse 
selection risk imposed upon the market maker were to decrease then a corresponding 
reduction in the size of the bid-ask spread should be noticed. It is hence postulated that this 
decrease in risk can arise from two possibilities: (1) the proportion of informed traders in 
the market declines or, (2) the information asymmetry of the market maker respective of 
the informed trader is reduced. In the latter case this implies that a market maker who is 
more informed and consequently more able to realise the true value more quickly and 
determine the actions or the identity of the informed trader to a better degree would, 
therefore, be more likely to quote a tighter, more efficient bid-ask spread, since the adverse 
losses unique to informed trading will now be relatively less.  
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For a competitive, risk-neutral market maker, this situation implies that since his losses per 
informed trade decreases, he now does not need to be compensated as greatly from the 
uninformed. This means that the implicit execution cost per trade of an uninformed trader is 
reduced and, thus, he is able to optimise further their order placement strategies. 
  
This is somewhat analogous to the analysis performed by Benveniste et al. (1992) who 
showed that if the specialist on the NYSE were able to distinguish between informed and 
uninformed traders then he would be in the position to be able explicitly to impose an extra 
charge on the informed traders, which permitted a reduction in the spread faced by the 
uninformed traders. This method of becoming informed is one aspect of informativeness 
that could pertain to the market maker; however, this paper considers other possible 
methods, such as the receipt of superior fundamental information, or the unique advantage 
to observe order flow. These two justifications for superior information given to the market 
maker are discussed below. 
 
2.4 Types of Information 
 
There are two distinct sources of information which can aid the market maker in the 
estimation of an asset’s value in the market: information on the firm’s fundamentals and 
information derived from order flow. Whilst the market maker’s use of order flow, and the 
effect of this on the market, has been previously studied, there is little known about the 
effect of the market maker having superior access to fundamental information. 
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2.4.1 Superior Fundamental Information 
It has been a widely accepted assumption that market makers do not have superior 
information on the fundamental value of a quoted asset. However, work by Peiers (1997), 
de Jong et al. (1999) and Sapp (2002) find that certain market makers on the foreign 
exchange market are able to incorporate new information into prices before other market 
markers. Specifically, Peiers (1997) examines tick-by-tick quote revisions for the six banks 
that input the most DM/US$ quotes on Reuters. The author finds that, using Granger-
causality tests, Deutsche Bank is the price leader in the market and it is able to disseminate 
information through trade before the official public Bundesbank intervention. The author 
finds that even though Deutsche Bank is trading strategically to minimise its disgorging of 
its informational advantage, the market becomes more efficient, more quickly. 
 
In a study on Nasdaq and its respective electronic communication networks, Huang (2002) 
discovered that some market makers were able to provide more timely information, which 
was reflected through their bid and ask quotes, and were able to engage actively in the price 
discovery process. It was also discovered that those market makers, who were then 
considered to be informed, were more often than not posting the inside quote in the market. 
Heidle and Li (2005) found similar results when they investigated Nasdaq market makers 
who were affiliated with the same brokerage house as recommending analysts. They found 
that a significant proportion of the time, these ‘brokerage’ market makers were able to 
quote the inside bid or ask up to three hours before the recommendations were made public 
to the market. It was also found that these market makers were trading in the direction of 
unreleased information. These findings supported the notion that analysts were leaking 
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information to the recommending market makers, which thus allowed the opportunistic 
actions by these informed recipients.11  
 
The authors note that this type of information leakage violates certain rules of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National Association of Security Dealers 
(NASD), in which they state: ‘The NASD Interpretative Memo IM-2110-4, titled “Trading 
Ahead of Research Reports” and approved by the SEC in August 1995, aims specifically at 
prohibiting a member firm “from purposefully establishing, creating or changing the firm’s 
inventory position” in a particular security “in anticipation of the issuance of a research 
report regarding such security by the member firm.” In our consultations with NASD 
attorneys, they indicate that the NASD may use Rule 2110 or other rules against a member 
firm that uses early access to research reports to solicit order flow from its clients.’ 
 
Heidle and Li (2005) also state that not only do regulators have rules that prohibit this type 
of information leakage, but industry associations issue such guidelines similarly. They find 
that the CFA Institute ‘requires its members to “deal fairly and objectively with all clients 
and prospects when disseminating investment recommendations, disseminating material 
changes in prior investment recommendations, and taking investment action” [Code of 
Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct (1999)].’ 
 
                                                 
11 Along these same lines, it is interesting to point out that Levitt (2003) found that bookmarkers, who were 
better at predicting prices in the market for gambling on NFL football, set prices to exploit their predictive 
abilities. The conclusions he drew for market making was that if a market maker acted like a bookmaker, as 
described in his study, then the market maker would do worse than if he was to simply equilibrate supply and 
demand. 
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However, on the Borsa Italiana, Nimalendran and Petrella (2003) found that the specialist 
was able to commit himself to enhance the quality of information released by companies in 
‘thinly-traded’ stocks. He was found to have lower adverse selection costs, and, due to his 
distinct and continuous relationship to the company, had superior information regarding the 
fundamentals of the company. It was found that the specialists in this market improved 
market quality, especially in small-cap stocks which had the higher levels of adverse 
selection. Similar findings to these were also reported by Anand et al. (2007). 
 
The result uncovered by these previous studies is that price discovery is facilitated by 
market makers who are superiorly informed with respect to the rest of the market, and that 
those market makers are able to post superior bid and ask quotes, thus suggesting increased 
market efficiency and decreased transaction costs for other market participants. However 
they also note that this may not be the case if the market makers act unethically, by trading 
on their information against client orders. This practice is not only illegal, but also costly 
for the uninformed participants of that market. 
 
Manaster and Mann (1999) confirmed this unethical behaviour when investigating market 
makers on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) who were found to be superiorly 
informed and traded in such a manner that the uninformed traders were at their mercy. It 
was discovered that market efficiency was hindered by such strategic trading and that 
spreads posted by informed market makers were wider than those set by their uninformed 
counterparts. Similarly, Calgagno and Lovo (2006) in a theoretical paper, addressed the 
issue of a single informed market maker existing in a multi-market maker model. Using a 
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strategic model, they proved that the informed market maker’s quotes were not efficient. 
Their prices incorporated wide spreads and were poorly reflective of the true value. The 
authors found that the informed market maker attempted to maximise his profit by trading 
on his informational asymmetry. Moreover, the market was found never to be strong-form 
efficient until the last stage of trading. Although the aim of this paper was to study the 
inter-dynamics of competitive market making, it shows the possibility that the market 
maker will trade strategically in such a way that can be detrimental to market welfare. 
 
A criticism of the previous two papers, however, is that the presence of informed traders 
was not found in either market. One of the key assumptions in the Calgagno and Lovo 
(2006) study was to assume away the role of informed traders. Nonetheless, the authors do 
state that under the presence of informed traders, the incentive for market makers to 
mislead the market would diminish, yet they left this possibility for further study. Manaster 
and Mann (1999) found that during their period of study, no traders outside of the 
superiorly informed market makers had any informational advantage; however, their 
analysis does not consider the possibility of the presence of informed traders. 
  
It is interesting to note the discrepancies in results between these different studies. Even 
though most of the informed market makers act strategically, the markets become more 
efficient and those market makers provide the best bid or ask prices when there are 
informed traders in the market. It suggests that informed traders limit the strategic 
behaviour of informed market makers. 
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2.4.2 Information Based on Order Flow 
A market maker who has the ability to observe order flow information will be able to 
reduce his adverse selection risk and therefore be in a better position to quote more 
competitively than otherwise. This idea was first suggested by Glosten (1989, p. 215), who 
stated that the specialist on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) ‘has information not 
about the future profitability of the firm or the future realisation of its stock price, but rather 
the uncertainty in the trading process’. This information arises from privileged access to the 
limit order book, through which he is consequently in a unique position to ‘know more 
about market activity since most trades will be crossed with him’ and is labelled a 
monopolist due to this unique advantage.12 Through this uncertainty, the market maker is 
able to infer values from orders and quotes he sees, as described by Greenberg (2003): ‘the 
specialist positions himself as a gatekeeper who has an unfair view of the direction in 
which bid and ask traffic is flowing and is likely to flow’. Thus, from order flow 
imbalances, the market maker will be able to determine more clearly the market clearing 
price that will ultimately produce a two-sided order flow, which may not necessarily be 
equal to the fundamental value. This particular information set implies that the market 
maker’s profit taking function will be based on short-term (and even intra-day) trading 
activity.  
 
Gammill (1989) gave the example of the ‘carrot’ as a form of compensation for private 
information. He demonstrated that the specialist has the ability to accept losses knowingly 
on individual trades in order to heighten competition among informed traders by 
                                                 
12 Although, as Glosten (1989, p. 215) further points out, the specialist on the NYSE is not a total monopolist: 
‘he faces competition from limit order submitters, other floor traders, and specialists in other securities’. 
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compensating (or facing losses from) only the first to reveal his or her private information. 
This strategy is one in which the specialist can use trades to mitigate his adverse selection 
problem. 
 
Saar (2001) showed that in any particular market, greater investor uncertainty increases the 
spread, decreases expected trading volume and hence lowers the welfare of all market 
investors. However, he showed that if the market contained a market maker who was expert 
in assessing the information content of the order flow, then the welfare on that same market 
concurrently increased. This was also confirmed by Pagano and Röell (1996), who 
developed a theoretical model that found that the visibility of the order flow to the market 
makers enhanced market liquidity by their being better able to protect themselves against 
losses to informed traders. This, therefore, allowed them to narrow their spreads.  
 
Similar findings have also been confirmed empirically by several authors. Madhavan and 
Panchapagesan (2000) found that the ability to observe the evolution of the limit order book 
on the NYSE conveys valuable information to the specialist. In particular, the specialist is 
able to use information from the order book to facilitate price discovery and set a more 
efficient opening price than the price that would prevail if only the market and limit orders 
were considered. Similarly, Coppejans and Domowitz (1999) examine a pure limit order 
market and conclude that the trading process is influenced only by the flow of orders, not 
the stock of orders on the book. Thus, the conclusion is that the book is not irrelevant, since 
flows, after all, are changes in stocks. Moreover, Madhavan et al. (2005) found that when 
the advantage of the unique access to order flow was taken away from the market maker on 
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the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), liquidity was significantly reduced and execution costs 
and volatility increased after the limit order book was publicly displayed. 
 
Anand and Subrahmanyam (2008), further analysing the TSX, confirmed that the market 
intermediaries were able to extract information from market prices at little or no 
opportunity costs, which gave them a comparative advantage to other traders who incur 
significant costs in analysing order flow. What is interesting from this study is that they 
found that even though these intermediaries had an informational advantage, the 
intermediaries did not trade inappropriately. That is, they did not engage in front-running or 
stepping ahead of orders. These findings are contrary to the allegations that specialists on 
the NYSE engaged in improper trading strategies, such as frontrunning and stepping ahead 
of client orders, through their unique advantage to order flow. These allegations have been 
the major reason for this unique access to be removed from the specialist on the NYSE with 
new exchange regulations such as the introduction of OpenBook, in which the limit order 
book is partially visible to all traders. 
 
However, Boehmer et al. (2005) found that the introduction of OpenBook resulted in 
decreased spreads and decreased the requirement for a specialist. This reflected the loss of 
the informational advantage to the specialist which therefore was effective in limiting the 
specialist’s strategic behaviour. This effect was also confirmed by Harris and 
Panchapagesan (2004), who demonstrated that the specialists would use the information 
contained in the limit order book to their advantage as they were able to infer future price 
movements and, thus, traded in ways that advantaged them over limit order traders.  
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In an experimental market setting, Bloomfield and O’Hara (2000) found that market 
makers who were able to observe the order flow were able to quote narrower spreads and 
avoid more money-losing trades than other market makers who did not have this privilege. 
The ability to quote narrower spreads as a result of becoming better informed was also 
confirmed by Bloomfield et al. (2004). It was discovered that the role of market makers is 
ultimately adopted by traders who are least subject to adverse selection when placing limit 
orders, which suggests that the role of the market maker is most suited for traders who have 
an informational advantage.  
 
Similarly, Anand and Subrahmanyam (2008) stated that the informed intermediaries were 
able to perform better market monitoring, and, thus, were able to avoid money-losing trades 
and incur lower trading costs. This study confirmed the results of Foucault et al. (2003) 
who found that market makers will choose to invest in costly information so as to reduce 
the risk of being picked off by professional day traders on Nasdaq’s small order execution 
system (SOES), who were labelled SOES ‘bandits’ by Nasdaq market makers. The authors 
found that if the market makers do not actively seek to reduce this risk, then the presence of 
the SOES bandits will harm market liquidity by bringing the market to a point where the 
market makers refuse to post quotes. Thus, the market maker with the ability to observe 
order flow information will be able to reduce this risk and, thus, quote more competitively. 
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3. The ModelsEquation Chapter (Next) Section 1
 
3.1 Models Description 
 
The basic structure of the models presented in this analysis is based upon the original 
sequential trade framework of GM with similar assumptions: all traders and the market 
maker are assumed to be risk-neutral. This assumption greatly simplifies a trader’s 
behaviour, since only the mean effects of his  behaviour is considered, however, if any of 
the market participants were to care about variance, then the decision making behaviour 
could be dramatically different. If the traders were risk-averse then one might observe 
behaviour that is linked to the proportion of informed traders in the market, for example. 
This paper confines its scope to traders who are risk-neutral in order to avoid excessive 
complexity of the models that are presented. 
 
In these models, the market maker may receive a signal on the risky asset’s value, and that 
signal may or may not be correct. He then continues to set a price according to his belief of 
the fair value of the asset. The unconditional prior distribution of the risky asset forms a 
Bernoulli: the true value is one with probability θ , and zero with probability 1 θ− . The 
realisation of the true value is at the close of the trading day. Trades can come from either 
informed or uninformed participants in the market at one given quantity. The issue of 
multiple order sizes is not examined in this paper, since it has been extensively discussed in 
papers by Easley and O’Hara (1987; 1992b).  
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The informed trader knows the fundamental value of the security and therefore buys if the 
asset is undervalued, or sells if it is overvalued. The asset is undervalued when the market 
maker’s ask price is less than the informed trader’s conditional expectation of the true 
value, and similarly overpriced when the market maker’s bid price is greater than the 
informed trader’s conditional expectation of the true value. The market runs for 
1, 2, ...,t T=  trading intervals. The sections that follow outline the assumptions used 
throughout the evaluation of the models. 
 
3.1.1 Insider Trading vs. Informed Trading & Conformity of the Market 
Before the description and evaluation of the models, one of the key assumptions to this 
study needs to be described and that is the issue of the definition of insider trading versus 
informed trading. This paper generally describes informed trading as legal trading based on 
superior analysis of public information, and insider trading as illegal. More formally, the 
SEC defines insider trading as:13 
 
‘Illegal insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, in 
breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while 
in possession of material, nonpublic information about the security. Insider 
trading violations may also include “tipping” such information, securities 
trading by the person “tipped,” and securities trading by those who 
misappropriate such information’ 
 
                                                 
13Available from the SEC’s website http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm. The reader is directed to the 
website for specific examples of illegal insider trading. 
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The definition of informed trading follows Harris (2003, p177, 197): 
 
‘Informed traders form reliable opinions about whether instruments are 
fundamentally undervalued or overvalued ... their opinions form insightful 
analysis of publicly available information or from simple analyses of 
information that is not widely known.... Informed traders understand 
fundamental instrument values better than other traders do. They have better 
access to fundamental data than do other traders, and they can better analyse 
the implications of their data than other traders can.’ 
 
Using the above definitions, this paper takes the approach that markets conform to market 
rules and regulations when no trader acts in accordance to the definition of insider trading 
as specified. Throughout this paper, the term ‘informed trading’ accords with the definition 
as specified above.  
 
3.1.2 The Market Maker 
This analysis only considers the behaviour of a single market maker; however, it is 
assumed that the market is in perfect competition, in which case the market maker would 
nonetheless act competitively, which would imply the potential existence of other 
competitors.14 It is also assumed that the market maker acts according to all rules and 
regulations set forth by the governing regulatory authorities and by his own internal 
                                                 
14 Although in the analysis to follow, the definition of an informed market maker is one who devotes 
extensive time and resources into becoming informed. Because of this, the market maker may only specialise 
in one security. However it is assumed that the costs of this are equal to the potential revenue and this would 
imply a competitive equilibrium. 
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controls.15 Therefore, the market maker does not misappropriate information in the event he 
receives information. Although this is a significant assumption to make, the opinion 
expressed in this paper is that market regulations (and even competition) would enforce a 
privileged market maker to behave, through negative obligations, as if he were a non-
monopolist.16 If this were the case, then the informational benefits (smaller spreads and 
increased efficiency as will be shown below) would be at least as large as those occurring 
in the market without informational advantages. Similarly, it is proposed by this paper that 
any market in which there exists a positive proportion of informed traders will limit the 
strategic behaviours employed by informed market makers. 
 
3.1.3 Signals 
The two models presented below are distinguished by the types and frequency of 
informative signals sent out to the market maker. An example of the first model presented 
can be considered as a case in which the market maker is part of an analyst brokerage house 
that provides him with information on a day-to-day basis in a dealer market.17 The second 
model is analogous to a situation in which the market maker may be part of a specialist 
system as found on the Borsa Italiana, in which he has an already established in-depth 
                                                 
15 For example, NASD Rule 2110, IM-2110-4 – Trading Ahead of Research Reports and NYSE Rule 401/01 
– Trading Against Firm Recommendations. See Heidle and Li (2005) for a comprehensive report on these 
rules and others. 
16 Consider, for example, some regulation practices such as the National Association of Security Dealers 
(NASD) Rules of Fair Practice. One of these rules (Article III, Section IV) specifically prohibits mark-ups 
(defined as the sale price over the purchase price) of more than 5%. An exchange may also impose negative 
obligations on the market maker, which include maximum spread rules, minimum depth rules and other rules 
to mitigate manipulative practices by market makers so that they act according to their fiduciary duties. 
17 This then would be similar to the situation found on Nasdaq as documents by Huang (2002) and Heidle and 
Li (2005). It is assumed that this provision of information from the brokerage house to the respective market 
maker does not conflict with NASD regulatory rules. 
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relationship with the firm for which he makes a market (as discussed by Nimalendran and 
Petrella, 2003).18 
 
Thus, in Model 1, the case is considered in which the market maker is part of an analyst 
brokerage firm that conducts extensive analysis about the risky asset’s value for that day on 
behalf of the market maker. There exists some probability that the analysts will be able to 
provide research to the market maker and, thus, give him a signal on that day. Conversely, 
the remaining probability is the situation in which the analysts will be unable to provide the 
market maker any information on that trading day. If some information is then sent to the 
market maker in the form of a signal, the market maker will attach a certain probability to 
the quality of the information contained in that signal. The probability he may assign to the 
quality of this signal may be estimated by analysing the correctness of previous signals and, 
thus, the probability reflects the proportion of times the analysts were correct in their 
analysis. If the market maker finds that he attaches a probability of one half to the 
correctness of the received signal, then the market maker should be in no different position 
from that in which he had not received any signal at all. The possibility of receiving a 
signal from the analysts only occurs at the beginning of the trading day. If he does not 
receive a signal, then he will quote in a normal risk-neutral competitive manner, as 
described in the GM model. 
  
                                                 
18 Although this analysis describes informative signals on fundamental values sent out to the market maker, 
this could further be extended to a situation where he has monopoly power to observe order flows in the 
market. As discussed previously, the market maker may learn more about the risky asset’s value through the 
alternative order forms and timing of trades; if this is the case, then he could be in a position to adjust his 
belief about the true value. For example, he may observe a large order flow imbalance in the book, which may 
cause him to revise his beliefs towards the bias and attach to this event some certain probability of this 
reflecting the true value. This is the case of the specialist as identified by Anand and Subrahmanyam (2007), 
who documented the ability to extract superior information from the order flow. 
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Model 2 describes a market similar to the Borsa Italiana, in which the market maker is 
required not only to make a market for companies, but also to act as the primary analyst of 
that firm with requirements to publish informative analyst reports.19 As in the Borsa 
Italiana, it is therefore assumed that the market maker has a longstanding and exclusive 
relationship with the firm for which he makes a market. Because of this, he has greater 
knowledge of that firm and is therefore able to gauge values just as well as informed traders 
in the market. Benveniste et al. (1992) found that long-term professional relationships 
between the specialist and brokers mitigated the effects of asymmetric information and that 
the specialists were able to ultimately improve the terms of trade of uninformed traders. 
 
The point needs to be made clear, however, that the firm does not provide direct 
informational incentives to the market maker, but rather, allows him to generate 
comprehensive reports on the value of the firm at some point in time at the firm’s 
discretion.20 The major assumption in this model, therefore, is that the market maker 
                                                 
19 This situation is relevant for small-mid cap stocks rather than for large stocks, because the former do not 
have significant numbers of analysts following them. The market maker’s responsibility, therefore, is to 
enhance the quality of the information released by companies and provide thorough analysis on the firm’s 
fundamentals. This analysis would then agree with the arguments put forward by Amihud and Mendelson 
(2000), who stated that value-maximising small firms should be willing to pay directly for analyst coverage. 
20 As stated by Nimalendren and Petrella (2003), a regulatory agreement would be required regarding the 
relationship between the firm and the market maker. The authors state that this agreement could take two 
forms: one in which the firm provides the specialist with funds to comply with market making obligations, 
and the other in which the firm shares the market maker’s profits or losses due to his market making duties. It 
is, therefore, in the interest of the firm to provide the market maker with access to information if either of 
these two agreements are created, as the firm would now have a profit-motivated incentive to reduce the 
informational asymmetry risk borne by the market maker. Note that in this paper, being able to extract all 
information from the company is referred to as receiving an informative signal. This is to keep the research of 
this paper in line with that of Model 1.  
Therefore, in this way, the firm, at their own discretion, will let the market maker know at some point in time 
when he is able to evaluate the fundamentals of the company, thus signalling to the market maker the ability 
to extract superior information, in which case he would become informed. A practical example of this is 
where the firm may set up meetings between the market maker and the CEO, CFO or other executives, who 
would be willing to provide public information about the firm at that given point in time. This direct contact 
means that the market maker is much better acquainted, at lower cost, with this public information than are 
other participants in the market. 
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extracts all possible information about that firm when the firm allows it. Therefore, in this 
particular model, the definition of a signal is loosely defined as the firm allowing the 
market maker ease of access to material public information, so as to generate all possible 
information regarding the fundamental value. In this event, it is assumed that the market 
maker becomes fully informed about true value and thus adjusts market prices to that value.  
 
The value that the market maker assigns to the probability of receiving this signal from the 
firm needs to be defined. Specifically, this paper assumes that the long-standing 
relationship the market maker has with the firm gives him the necessary information to 
predict under what circumstance the firm will send him a signal. For example, the market 
maker may assign an increasing probability as his requirement to release an analyst report 
draws nearer. It is in the firm’s interests to provide the market maker the information 
needed to release this analyst report (as shown by Amihud and Mendelson, 2000 and 
Anand et al., 2007). In this dynamic way, the market maker may calculate his probabilistic 
signal. 
 
3.1.4 Informed Traders 
The informed trader will only trade in the direction of the mispricing in the market so as to 
maximise expected profits. Once prices reach their full informational value, the informed 
traders will no longer trade, as they gain no other utility from buying or selling at the 
fundamental value. The number of informed traders is set exogenously to the model; the 
reasoning is that in perfect competition the profits of any informed trader must be equal to 
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the cost of becoming informed which, thus, reduces the problem of specifying a correct 
proportion of informed traders in the market.  
 
Now, if all traders were profit motivated, then the traders who are uninformed would do 
better by leaving the market rather than face a certain loss through the possibility of trading 
with an informed trader (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982; and Black, 1986). If this were the case 
and all uninformed traders left the market, the market maker would no longer be able to 
subsidise his losses with uninformed gains and thus the market would break down with his 
bid at the asset’s potential low value, and his ask at the asset’s potential high value.21 In this 
situation, the market participants (all of whom are informed) will refuse to trade since, as 
previously stated, they gain no utility from trading other than for profit motivated reasons. 
Thus, this sub-optimal equilibrium results in market failure, a variant of the market-for-
lemons problem first identified by Akerlof (1970). To prevent this from happening, the 
uninformed must have some motivation to trade other than speculative profit, such as 
liquidity motivated reasons, as discussed below. This will, therefore, allow the market 
maker to set a narrower spread in which he will be able to subsidise losses from the 
informed with gains from the uninformed traders. 
 
3.1.5 Uninformed Traders 
Liquidity trading occurs for motivations exogenous to the price, and involves the need for 
buying or selling a specific quantity at a particular point in time. Possible motivations for 
                                                 
21 In the case where the true value does not follow a Bernoulli distribution, but perhaps some other random 
distribution, the market maker will set an infinitely large spread in which his bid would be at extreme lowest 
value at zero and the ask at an infinitely high value so as to encapsulate any possible outcome for the true 
value. 
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trade may include tax planning, immediate consumption needs, and other investment or 
lending opportunities. As per previous research, this paper formally models the motivation 
for liquidity based trading as a shock to the uninformed trader’s time preference. This 
analysis specifically follows the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) study, in which all traders 
discount their future consumption by a discount factor ρ , such that the value at the time of 
liquidation will be TCρ , where TC is their present utility value of consumption.  
 
The factor ρ is deterministic of the consumption shock of the individual and can take one 
of two values: 0ρ =  implies the need to sell one unit of the asset to satisfy consumption 
today, whilst ρ = ∞  implies the need to purchase one unit so as to defer consumption 
indefinitely. As per Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), the use of the extreme values is for 
simplicity in interpretation of the consumption demands of the uninformed traders.  
 
Thus, with the inclusion of the uninformed traders in the market, analysis can now be 
performed on the effects of security price adjustment in these particular models. In order to 
study these effects, trading must take place during a multi-period interval. This is in 
contrast to the situation in models such as that of Copeland and Galai (1983) and Kyle 
(1985), in which the trading day consists of one point in time where traders can execute at 
the market maker’s quotes. 
 
As identified by Easley and O’Hara (1992b), there exists a problem with specifying such a 
dynamic trading protocol for the particular market described in the model. There are two 
main types of markets that can exist in practice. Firstly, a call market is one in which orders 
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accumulate together until some specific point in time, when the market is ‘called’, in which 
the orders execute all at one price determined from a specific algorithm only after all the 
orders have arrived. The other type of market is defined as being continuous in which 
orders can execute at the time in which they arrive to the market at the prevailing price 
quoted in the market.22 Thus, continuous markets differ in that execution and price is 
confirmed immediately upon trade entry; whilst in the call market, order execution is 
uncertain, as is the price at which orders can be executed. Hence, in the market described 
for the previous models, the trading mechanism will be a mixture of the two differing 
markets. The dynamics of this, essentially, are that the market maker sets a price, at which 
point a single trader arrives at the market and trades at that predetermined price. The market 
then stops until the market maker revises his quotes, at which point the market resumes and 
another trader is selected to trade. Thus, such a combination of a call and a continuous 
market describes the process in which trades can sequentially occur. The next section will 
now describe the first model in detail. 
 
3.2 Model 1 - Mechanics 
 
The economy of Model 1 operates as follows (refer to Figure 2 for illustration of the 
mechanics, and Table 1 for summary of this notation). At the beginning of the trading day, 
there is a random realisation of the true value of the risky asset, which can exist as either a 
low value of V  determined as V , or as a  high value of V  determined as V . After this 
step, the market maker may then receive a signal indicating the true value. This signal can 
                                                 
22 See O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) for further inspection of differing trading mechanisms. 
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be noisy and hence may give him either a correct or an incorrect value. It is at this point 
that the market opens with the market maker’s quotes, which are conditional upon the 
receipt of a signal or not. The trading day is then split up into t trading intervals of arbitrary 
length. In particular, at each time t a trader is randomly chosen from the set of informed and 
uninformed traders, and has the option of purchasing one unit of the asset at the market 
maker’s ask price or selling one unit of the asset at the market maker’s bid price. An 
informed trader will only buy the asset if he knows the true value of the risky asset as V , 
and similarly he will only sell the asset if he knows the true value of the risky asset as V . 
Note that, since the informed trader is risk-neutral, he will only trade provided that the 
currently observed market price is not at its full information value. If this is the case then he 
will not be a motivated to trade and, thus, will not trade with the market maker if he is 
chosen. After a trade is transacted, the market maker will revise his quotes conditional upon 
the recently executed trade. For the trading process in the next time interval, only the trader 
selection process and his direction to trade is repeated, so the trading interval is repeated 
after the dotted line on the tree diagram of Figure 2, which reflects the receipt of a signal 
only once during the course of the trading day. 
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Figure 2 Model 1 Tree Diagram and Market Operation 
 
 
 
 
 
Tree diagram describing the process of a trade transacting with the market maker, whereθ  is the probability of a high value of V occurring, α  is the probability 
that the market maker receives a signal, δ is the probability that the signal is correct, μ  is the probability that a trade originates from an informed trader, γ is the 
probability that an uninformed trader is a buyer. Nodes to the left of the dotted line occur only at the beginning of the trading day; nodes to the right are repeated 
during the trading interval. Thus, the trading interval is defined only after there is a possibility of receiving a signal. 
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Table 1 A summary of notation used in Figures 1, 2 and 5 and throughout the 
remainder of the paper 
Variable Definition 
 V  Realisation of the true asset value, { },V V V=  
 V  The asset’s high possible value 
 V  The asset’s low possible value 
 *V  The market maker’s expected unconditional value of the asset 
 θ  Probability of the realisation of V  
 S Ω  Set of all possible signals: {No Signal, Signal = V , Signal =V } 
 CS  Realisation of no signal 
 S  Realisation of a signal 
 S  Realisation of a high signal 
 S  Realisation of a low signal 
 α  Probability of the receipt of a signal 
 δ  Probability of the signal correctness 
 μ  Probability that a given trader is informed 
 γ  Probability than an uninformed trader will buy 
 
Note that all market participants know the probability of each variable occurring. 
 
3.2.1 Model 1 – Beliefs and Prices23 
The market maker is a Bayesian who knows the structure of the market and the associated 
probabilities with each event happening. He does not know, however, the realisation of V, 
whether his signal (if received) is correct or not, and whether or not the next trader chosen 
to trade will be informed. Thus, the market maker discovers the true value through his set 
of information, which depends on the receipt of a signal, the value of that signal and about 
the previously transacted trades. 
  
At the opening of the trading day, the market maker will first revise his belief of the asset’s 
value, conditional upon the receipt of a signal, and upon the nature of that signal. The case 
of V occurring is only considered throughout the remainder of this paper.24 The first point 
                                                 
23 See Appendix A.4 for all derivations and full mathematical expressions for Model 1. 
24 The model, however, is symmetric, and will thus yield results similar to analysis performed on V . 
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to note is that there will be a significant difference in the approach taken by the market 
maker when adjusting his beliefs by Bayes’ theorem, as indicated by previous studies. In 
these studies, the market maker does not receive any other given information, hence his 
prior probability of V  occurring is unconditional, which is defined as ( )Pr V V θ= = . 
Thus, in this model the market marker will now need to update this probability conditional 
upon the realisation of a signal. That is, his prior probability, denoted by 0
Sθ Ω , will now 
become ( )0Pr V V SΩ= , where 0S Ω  denotes the realisation of the signal at time 0, and its 
outcome.25 Hence, the market maker’s prior probability of V is going to be conditioned 
upon one of three possible signal outcomes:26 (1) no signal ( )CS , (2) a signal with a low 
value ( )S S∩ , or (3) a signal with a high value ( )S S∩ .27  
 
Thus, the market maker’s initial posterior probability will be conditional upon the receipt of 
a signal at time 0 and upon a certain trader action, 1A  where { }Buy, SellA∈  and where the 
subscript 1 represents the first action. It should be noted that in the case of a no signal, the 
model reduces to the GM model. However, more generally the market maker’s initial 
posterior probability is defined as, 28 
 
                                                 
25 Specifically, { } { }No Signal, Signal , Signal , ,CS V V S S SΩ = = = = . 
26 Note that the respective probabilities for the low value can simply be found by taking the complementary 
probability for the high value. That is, ( ) ( )0 01 1Pr 1 PrV S A V S AΩ Ω= −∩ ∩ . 
27 As a result of the extra conditionality, an extended version of Bayes’ Rule that allows for the use of three 
variables must be used. See Appendix A.2 for an introductory analysis to the general three-variable Bayes’ 
Rule and for the derivations of all priors, posteriors and prices of the three cases of different signals. As noted 
previously, V reflects the occurrence that V V= . 
28 See Appendix A.3 for a proof on the no signal case reducing to the GM model.  
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= +
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∩ ∩
∩ ∩ ∩ ∩
 (3.1) 
 
This revision in beliefs about a high value occurring becomes stronger (weaker) for a buy 
(sell) when the proportion of informed traders increases. Note that this is independent of the 
receipt of a signal. Mathematically, 
 
 
0
Buy,1 0
Sθ
μ
Ω∂ >∂  (3.2) 
 
 
 
0
Sell,1 0
Sθ
μ
Ω∂ <∂  (3.3) 
 
It is also interesting to see this revision of beliefs when the market maker does receive a 
signal. In the case in which he receives a high signal, the probability he attaches to a high 
value occurring becomes stronger, independent of the trader action. This is demonstrated in 
equation (3.4) below, 
 
 
0 0
Buy,1 Sell,10 0
S Sθ θ
δ δ
∂ ∂> >∂ ∂  (3.4) 
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However, in the case in which he receives a low signal, the opposite revision occurs. As the 
quality of the signal increases, then his belief about the asset having a high value decreases. 
This can analogously be stated thus: when the quality of the signal decreases and he 
receives a low signal, then his beliefs about a true value occurring will be stronger. This 
situation is further explored in Section 3.2.4.  
 
 
0 0
Buy,1 Sell,10 0
S Sθ θ
δ δ
∂ ∂< <∂ ∂  (3.5) 
 
The market maker’s quotes will now be an expectation of the asset value conditional upon 
the market maker’s current information set and also conditional upon a trader action. 
Specifically, his bid price will be conditional upon a sell action. This ensures that his quotes 
are thus ex-post regret free, meaning that the bid price is the market maker’s fair price for 
the asset if someone sells to him; this is given as: 
 
 ( )0 00 0 Sell SellBid Sell 1S SS E V S V Vθ θΩ ΩΩ Ω⎡ ⎤= = + −⎣ ⎦∩  (3.6) 
 
Similarly, the market maker’s ask price is his expectation of the asset given that a trader 
wants to purchase from him, conditional upon his belief of the value of the asset given his 
current information set, 
 
 ( )0 0 00 0 Buy BuyAsk Buy 1S S SE V S V Vθ θΩ Ω ΩΩ⎡ ⎤= = + −⎣ ⎦∩  (3.7) 
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The spread is, thus, defined as the difference between his current ask and current bid price, 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )( )
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0 Buy Sell Sell Buy
Buy Sell
Spread Ask Bid S S S SS S S
S S
V V
V V
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
Ω Ω Ω ΩΩ Ω Ω
Ω Ω
= − = − + −
= − −
 (3.8) 
 
It is important to note that the quotes strike a balance between the informed and the 
uninformed traders. To show this, the bid and ask are decomposed into actions defined by 
the uninformed traders, denoted U, and the informed traders, denoted I, 
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Sell Pr Sell
S E V S E V S U U S
E V S I I S
Ω Ω Ω Ω
Ω Ω
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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∩ ∩ ∩ ∩
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 (3.9) 
 
 
( )
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0
0 0 0 0
0 0
Ask Buy Buy Pr Buy
Buy Pr Buy
S E V S E V S U U S
E V S I I S
Ω Ω Ω Ω
Ω Ω
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ ⎣ ⎦
∩ ∩ ∩ ∩
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 (3.10) 
 
Thus, if the market maker acts competitively, such that the expected gain or loss on any one 
trade is zero, then this balance between the informed and uninformed from equation (3.9) 
can be rewritten as,  
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 (3.11) 
 
Similarly, the market maker’s ask price as denoted in equation (3.10) can also be rewritten 
explicitly to show the balancing of losses from informed traders with gains from the 
uninformed traders: 
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 (3.12) 
 
The left-hand side of equations (3.11) and (3.12) demonstrate the expected gain on a trade 
executed by an uninformed trader, whilst the right-hand side demonstrates the expected loss 
on a trade with the informed. To show how the market maker will minimise his losses, the 
next section of this paper analyses how the market maker learns from the trade sequence 
and how this, in turn, affects the adjustment of prices to information. 
 
3.2.2 Model 1 – Dynamics of Beliefs and Prices 
Since the market maker is adjusting his beliefs according to Bayes’ theorem, his beliefs and 
thus, subsequently, his prices will evolve over the course of the trading day. The 
 55 
 
movements in these beliefs and prices correspond to his learning about the true population 
distribution given the underlying observed information. In Figure 2, all trader actions are 
constant, except in the case in which there is a realisation of a high value compared to a low 
value. In this situation, the informed will buy the asset; as opposed to selling it had the 
asset’s value be low. Thus, the probability of a buy is only dependent upon a realised value 
outcome. Moreover, the traders are serially independent throughout the trading day, which 
means that these probabilities will remain constant (until the market maker’s prices 
converge to the true value). This is demonstrated in equations (3.13) and (3.14) which state 
that at any given point in time, i, the probability of a buy is equal to the probability of 
another buy at any other given point in time, j.    
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 0Pr Buy Pr Buy 1 ,i jS V S V i jμ μ γΩ Ω= = + − ∀∩ ∩  (3.13) 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 0Pr Buy Pr Buy 1 ,i jS V S V i jμ γΩ Ω= = − ∀∩ ∩  (3.14) 
 
This result then suggests that the probability of observing b amount of buys in n total 
number of trades will, thus, form a binomial distribution condition upon the realised value 
of the asset, V, and any given signal outcome 0S
Ω :  
  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )0 1  Pr Buys , 1 1  n bb if V Vb n S V p p where p if V Vμ μ γμ γ−Ω
⎧ + − =⎪= − = ⎨ − =⎪⎩
∩  (3.15) 
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Thus, the probability of observing b number of buys, conditional only upon n trades and the 
signal outcome, is the weighted average of the two binomial distributions according to the 
probabilities associated with the realisation of V, 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0
0 0
Pr Buys , Pr Pr Buys , Pr Pr Buys ,
Pr Buys , 1 Pr Buys ,
b n S V b n S V V b n S V
b n S V b n S Vθ θ
Ω Ω Ω
Ω Ω
= +
= + −
∩ ∩
∩ ∩
 (3.16) 
 
Equation (3.16) is graphically demonstrated in Figure 3 below. The number of observed 
trades, n, is equal to 100, the probability of an uninformed trader buying the asset is fixed at 
γ =0.5, the probability that the asset is high is θ =0.5, whilst the proportion of informed 
trading varies, specifically μ∈{0, 0.5, 0.9}. The interpretation of the figure is that if 
( )or V V V V= = , as the proportion of informed traders increases, then the market maker 
should notice an increasingly (decreasingly) disproportionate number of buys to sells out of 
all given observed trades, n. Interestingly, the distribution becomes bimodal as the 
proportion of informed trading in the market increases, which allows the market maker to 
revise his prior belief of the true asset’s value as he observes any given amount of buys and 
sells throughout the trading day.  
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Figure 3 Distribution of buys over 100 trades 
 
 
Binomial distribution for the expected number of buys conditional on the true value. The proportion of 
uninformed trading is kept constant at γ = 0.5, the probability of a high value of the asset occurring is 
θ = 0.5. The binomial distributions are then graphed according to the proportion of informed traders 
in the market, which has been shown for μ ∈{0, 0.5, 0.9} 
 
 
The process through which the market maker adjusts his beliefs about the asset’s value is 
thus conditional upon the transaction history. Specifically, he will adjust his belief after 
each observed trade, conditional upon that most recent action and his initial information set. 
The sequential revision process is thus described by the following process. The market 
maker sets an initial spread based on his prior belief, which will be conditional upon the 
receipt of a signal or not. A trader arrives at the market and transacts at one of the market 
maker’s quotes. The market maker revises his belief about the asset’s value, now 
conditional upon the direction of the recent trade, and subsequently revises his quotes, at 
which point another trader arrives and trades, and then the market maker will revise his 
beliefs again such that this process will be repeated. 
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This recursion process is clear in the expression for 0
1
S
Aθ Ω  from equation (3.1) as it maps the 
prior probability, 00
Sθ Ω , into a posterior probability conditional upon the direction of the 
trader action. To illustrate this recursive pattern in general form, let 0
k
S
Aθ Ω denote the market 
maker’s posterior probability of a high value occurring given all past information until time 
1t k= − , denoted by 0
1k
S
Aθ Ω−  and also conditional upon the direction of the kth recently 
transacted trade direction, kA ; where the market maker’s initial information set is given as 
his prior belief conditional upon the receipt of a signal, ( )00 0PrS V Sθ Ω Ω= . Thus, 
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0
0 0
0
1
Pr
Pr
Pr Pr
Pr
k k
S S
A A k
V
k
V V
k k
k
V
k i
i
V A
V S
V S V S
where A V S
θ θ
π
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∩
∩
∩ ∩
∩
 (3.17) 
 
Equation (3.17) can be expressed as such because all probabilities in the decision tree, 
except for 
i
S
Aθ Ω , are constant across time. This equation defines the stochastic process of 
beliefs and demonstrates, based on observed trades, how the market maker will adjust the 
probability that he places on a high value of the asset occurring, conditional upon his initial 
signal outcome. Observing more buy actions than sell actions, for example, could possibly 
mean that the informed participants are trading on the realisation of a high value, which 
suggests that the market maker needs to increase 0
k
S
Aθ Ω . However, there is a possibility that 
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this increased number of buys could be the result of a random draw of uninformed trading, 
which would then suggest that 0
k
S
Aθ Ω  should remain the same. Hence, the market maker will 
need to adjust 0
k
S
Aθ Ω dependent upon the likelihood of each possibility occurring.29 
 
Another implication of this learning process is that it is first influenced by the receipt of a 
signal; if the market maker initially receives a high signal (low signal), then his belief that a 
high value has occurred will be higher (lower) given the observed trade history, than 
otherwise. The revision in the market maker’s beliefs will subsequently affect the direction 
of the market maker’s prices. Thus, for the market maker’s belief of a high value occurring 
as defined by (3.17), his bid and ask prices at any time 1t k= −  will now be defined as: 
 
 ( )0 0 0 01 1 11 , Sell ,SellBid Sell 1k k k k kS S S Sk A k A AE V V Vθ θ θΩ Ω Ω Ω− − −− ⎡ ⎤= = + −⎣ ⎦∩  (3.18) 
 
 ( )0 0 0 01 1 11 ,Buy ,BuyAsk Buy 1k k k k kS S S Sk A k A AE V V Vθ θ θΩ Ω Ω Ω− − −− ⎡ ⎤= = + −⎣ ⎦∩  (3.19) 
 
The bid ask spread at time 1t k= +  will, therefore, be: 
 
0 0 0
1 1 1Spread Ask Bid
S S S
k k k
Ω Ω Ω
− − −= −  
                                                 
29 Specifically, the reason why this is so is because the probability of observing a buy is higher when the 
asset’s value is high, and, conversely, lower if the asset’s value is low. Thus, an observation of a buy at any 
one point in time will always cause an upward revision in his belief that the value of the asset is high. 
Similarly, if he observes a sell then this will cause a downward revision in that same belief. 
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( ) ( )
0 0
1 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1,Buy , Sell ,Sell ,Buy
Buy Sell
k k
k k k k k k k k
S S
A k A k
S S S S
A A A A
E V E V
V V
θ θ
θ θ θ θ
Ω Ω
− −
Ω Ω Ω Ω
− − − −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
= − + −
∩ ∩
 (3.20) 
 
Note that given the parameter distributions, the spread as defined in (3.20) will form a 
convex function with maximum value defined as the unconditional expectation of the value 
of the asset, *V , and minimum values at V  and V . The reason this is so is because the 
market maker’s posteriors 0
1 ,Buyk k
S
Aθ Ω−  and 01, Sellk kSAθ
Ω
− converge at an exponential rate as the 
market maker becomes more confident about the true value. In other words, a buy or a sell 
will add little to the market maker’s belief about the true value of the asset as he becomes 
increasingly confident about the realisation of the true value of the asset.  
 
As the market maker’s belief changes, so will his prices.30 The expected change in his 
prices across time will follow the notional theory of semi-strong form market efficiency as 
proved in Proposition 1 below. 
  
Proposition 1. Transaction prices form a martingale relative to the market maker’s 
information set. 
 
 Proof:  Denote tP  as the most recently transacted price. From (3.17), 0t
S
t AP E V θ Ω⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
 
                                                 
30 These changes in prices can be thought of as market impact from trades. From an empirical standpoint, this 
implies that the observed price impact in the market can be related back to this model and hence be used as a 
proxy to measure information asymmetries across trades. 
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Hence,   0 0 0 0
11 t t t t
S S S S
t A A A A tE P E E V E V Pθ θ θ θΩ Ω Ω Ω++ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  
 
This proposition demonstrates an important implication for market efficiency, which states 
that in competitive markets with rational, risk-neutral participants, returns are 
unpredictable. This follows from what has been found in existing literature such as 
previously shown by Mandelbrot (1966). 
 
Reverting to the revision process of the market maker’s beliefs, several questions follow. 
Firstly, does the price process converge to a specific value in the limit? Secondly, if prices 
do converge, then what do they converge to? Finally, regarding the speed of convergence, 
how quickly do prices converge to that value? To answer this, the following two 
propositions are put forward: 31 
 
Proposition 2. The posterior belief converges almost surely to the true realisation of 
the asset. 
 
Proof:   As shown in Appendix A.6, the log of the odds ratio of the market 
maker’s beliefs on the outcome of the asset’s value converges almost surely to the 
Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence between the probability of a buy conditional upon a 
high value occurring, p, and the probability of a buy conditional upon a low value 
occurring, q. That is, 
                                                 
31 The proofs put forward have been adapted from O’Hara (1995) to suit the nature of Model 1. See Appendix 
A.6 and Appendix A.7 for full proofs of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 respectively. Appendix A.5 also 
contains an introduction to the concept of almost surely. 
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( )
( ) ( )0, 0
Pr ,1lim ln .
Pr , KLb s
V S b s
a s D p q
b s V S b s
Ω
Ω→∞
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ −+ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∩
JJJG∩
 (3.21) 
 
Since q p≠ , then ( ) 0KLD p q > , which implies that the left-hand side of (3.21) is 
negative. This can only occur when 
( )
( )0, 0
Pr ,
lim 0
Pr ,b s
V S b s
V S b s
Ω
Ω→∞ →
∩
∩  or 
( )0,lim Pr , 0b s V S b sΩ→∞ →∩  which suggests that the market maker’s belief about a low value 
occurring given b buys and s sells converges to zero, which then implies that the true value 
V must be high. The implications of this proposition demonstrate that the market maker’s 
beliefs eventually converge and will actually converge to their full informational value; and 
as such, market prices will eventually become strong-form efficient. The next proposition 
demonstrates the speed at which this occurs. 
 
Proposition 3. A Bayesian’s posterior who has observed an independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) process over time converges 
exponentially. 
 
Proof:   Similarly, in Appendix A.7, it is shown that, 
 
( )
( ) ( )0 .0
Pr ,
lim . 0 at rate
Pr ,
KLt D p q
t
V S b s
a s e
V S b s
Ω
−
Ω→∞
= &∩ JJJG∩  
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This demonstrates that the market maker’s revision of beliefs converge to the true value at 
an exponential rate, with respect to the number of trades in the market and the (KL) 
Divergence between the probabilities of a buy in either state of nature for V.  
 
3.2.3 Example of Model 1 
Consider the following possible trading sequence Q ={Buy1, Buy2, Sell3, Buy4, Buy5}. The 
market maker knows that the probability that the asset value is high is θ =0.5, V = 100 and 
that V = 0, the probability that the signal is correct is δ =0.7, the proportion of informed 
traders in the market is μ =0.5, and finally the probability of an uninformed buy occurring 
is γ =0.5. In this example, the three possible single outcomes are examined. That is, 
whether he receives a high signal, a low signal or no signal at all. Hence, using (3.18) and 
(3.19), the market maker’s bid and ask prices and the price path are demonstrated in Figure 
4 below.  
 
There are few points to note here. Firstly, the initial bid and ask prices for the three 
different situations are highly dependent upon the receipt of a signal. Specifically, in the 
cases in which he does receive a signal (be it high or low), the initial spread is smaller than 
the no-signal case. This reduced spread is further explored in Section 4 however, the 
reasoning is that it now reflects the probability of the receipt of a correct signal and, thus, 
justifies the market maker’s decision to quote a narrower spread since he is now, in 
expectation terms, more informed than otherwise.   
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Figure 4 An Example of Various Price Paths in Model 1  
 
 
Bid and ask price paths under the parameter values previously defined. S  represents the price path upon 
receipt of a high (correct) signal. S  represents the price path upon receipt of a low (incorrect) signal. The GM 
bid and ask are synonymous to the no signal bid and ask case. Values given in parenthesis represent the 
market maker’s price given the most recent trade action. 
 
If the market maker believes the signal to be more correct than not, then it is clear that his 
initial prices are going to reflect these beliefs. Thus, the case in which he receives a high 
signal causes him to price his initial beliefs higher than if he did not receive a signal at all. 
This is so since the quality of the signal here is 0.7, which reflects that the market maker is 
70% certain that he has received a correct signal. Similarly, if he received a low signal then 
his beliefs will be stronger about the asset’s value being low.  
 
As the market maker is more confident that not in his signal, he can become ‘fooled’ into 
quoting more incorrect prices than in the case of a no signal event. What then is interesting 
is that when he sees a buy (at t = 0), he not only moves his spread upwards (as stated 
previously) but he also actually widens his spread to reflect his increased uncertainty in the 
quality of the received signal. Eventually, as the market maker becomes more confident of 
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the asset’s true value, the spread narrows to reflect this information. However, in this 
situation, the market will actually be worse off than what it would have been if he had not 
received any signal at all. Although there is a lower probability of this occurring, analysis 
needs to be performed as to whether this disadvantage can outweigh the advantage of 
receiving a correct signal. This is further explored in Section 4.  
 
One other general aspect about the adjustment path is that the convergence is not uniform. 
In the path depicted, all quotes move in the wrong direction when there is a sell at time t = 
3, before further converging to the value V . This reflects the fact that the uninformed 
trades are randomly distributed and can, thus, confuse the market maker. This uncertainty 
causes the market maker to respond by changing his quotes and spread size, and hence 
reversals in the direction of the order flow can greatly influence the size of his quoted 
spread.  
 
This negative effect in direction of order flow and spread size is due to the fact that the size 
of the spread is a concave function of the expected value of the asset that reaches its 
maximum at the unconditional expectation of value ( ) ( )* Pr PrV V V V V= + . Accordingly, 
it can be stated that the further away the market maker’s prices move from possible values 
of V, and the closer to *V  then the wider the spread becomes since the market maker is now 
more uncertain of the value of the asset occurring. Conversely, the closer the market 
maker’s expectation of the asset’s value becomes to one of the possible values of V, the 
smaller his spread will become.  
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This relationship reflects how the size of the spread acts as an indicator of the market 
maker’s uncertainty about either value of the asset occurring, where this uncertainty is at a 
maximum when his posterior approaches the initial unconditional prior θ . In this example, 
this occurs when the market maker receives a low signal and his prices approach the 
unconditional expectation of the asset’s value, that is equal to *V = 50, due to buys in the 
market.  
 
Over time, however, the true value is eventually revealed by the increased proportion of 
buys in the market due to the informed trading, and prices will eventually converge to V as 
demonstrated by Proposition 2. To characterise the general process of adjustment to the true 
asset value, Section 5 will examine how the price path convergence will change with 
varying market parameters. The next section presents a general discussion on the variation 
in the quality of the signal.  
 
3.2.4 Specific Cases of δ : 0 δ≤ <0.5, δ = 0.5, 0.5 δ< ≤1   
The quality of the signal the market maker receives is represented by the parameter δ . 
When analysing the model, it is important to consider how this parameter affects the market 
maker’s perception of the quality of the signal and, thus, his informational advantage. Three 
different cases need to be specifically considered. The first of these occurs when 0.5δ = . 
This situation is not a difficult one to understand. It describes the fact that if the market 
maker does receive a signal then he will only be 50% confident of its content and it will not 
provide him any additional information compared to the case in which he does not receive a 
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signal. Thus, this case reduces to the GM model and it is expected that convergence and 
spread size will be equivalent.  
 
Next, when the quality of the signal is between the two bounds, 0.5 1δ< ≤ , and the market 
maker does receive a signal, then he knows that his signal, on average, will be more correct 
than not. As a result, he will revise his quotes in the direction of the received signal. The 
extreme case of this is when 1δ = and he knows that as soon as he receives a signal he will 
be completely confident in content. On the odd chance that the market maker receives an 
incorrect signal, then he will be penalised by the informed traders. Considering, however, 
that his prices are conditional expectations about the asset’s value, this possibility is priced 
into his quotes and as such still remains ex-post regret free.  
 
The question, however, then arises as to whether the positive effects associated with the 
market maker receiving a correct signal (faster convergence and smaller average spread 
size) outweigh the negative effects on the market associated with the receipt of an incorrect 
signal (slower convergence and potential increased spread size). This is further explored in 
Sections 4 and 5. 
 
Finally, the case in which the quality of the signal is between the following bounds, 
0 0.5δ≤ < , is perhaps the most interesting. The implication of this probability is such that, 
when the market maker receives a signal, then he will know that, on average, the 
information contained in the signal will be more incorrect than not. How the market maker 
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perceives this signal is perhaps best explained in the words of Jerry Seinfeld to his friend 
George Costanza in the episode ‘The Opposite’: 32 
 
‘If every instinct you have is wrong, then the opposite would have to be right.’ 
 
These astute words imply that when the market maker knows he receives a signal of little 
quality, then he prices quotes in the opposite direction to the content contained in the 
signal. In doing this, on average, his pricing should be more efficient than that in the 
reduced case of 0.5δ = . In fact, on average, the informational advantage is symmetric 
around 0.5δ =  with maximum advantages at 0δ =  and at 1δ = . The implication of this is 
that as long as he receives some information, whether it is correct or incorrect, then the 
market maker should be able to price more competitively and more accurately, on average. 
 
3.3 Model 2 – Mechanics 
 
The economy of Model 2 is slightly different from that in Model 1. The differences can be 
observed by referring to Figure 5. Table 1 similarly summarises the parameter notation. 
There are three main differences in the mechanics of this model. The first is identified at 
the node after a market maker receives a signal, as it is here that he is now completely 
confident of the true value of the firm, given his valuation of the company.33 This implies 
that, once the market maker receives this signal, he will revise his beliefs automatically 
                                                 
32 ‘Seinfeld’, 1990 – Season 5, Episode 21. 
33 As previously explained, this situation arises because the market maker now has been given the chance to 
value the company and has been able to become informed regarding the fundamentals of that stock. The 
probability of this event is defined as the probability of receiving a signal on the value of the company, and 
can be stated as the probability that the firm will allow the market maker to value the company. 
 69 
 
about the asset’s true value according to that signal and consequently adjust his quotes to 
their full informational value. As a result, selected informed traders will no longer trade (as 
stated previously), which is the second main difference. The final difference in this model, 
is that now the market is repeated before the market maker receives a signal. What this 
means is that as long as the probability of receiving a signal, α , is positive, then there is a 
renewed chance to receive a signal after a previously transacted trade and learn the 
realisation of the asset’s value at some time during the course of the trading day, 
independent of the trade process. The probability that the market maker assigns to receiving 
a signal, as stated previously, may be one that is determined before he has to release an 
analyst brokerage report.34 The next section outlines the market maker’s beliefs and prices 
according to this model. 
 
3.3.1 Model 2 – Beliefs and Prices35 
The market maker’s prior probabilities are similar to that as described in Model 1, in which 
they are still dependent upon the realisation of an initial signal or not. For a no signal event, 
the market maker’s prior probability that the event V V=  has occurred is thus, 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )00 0 0
Pr Pr
Pr Pr Pr Pr
C
C
S
C C
V S V
V S V V S V
θ θ= =+  (3.22) 
  
                                                 
34 In practice, this probability should therefore dynamically change on an intraday level, according to whether 
he receives a signal or not. However, it is assumed that the trading interval as specified is one in which there 
is a constant probability, where the probability then changes after the trading day.  
35 See Appendix A.8 for all derivations and full mathematical expressions in Model 2. 
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In addition, the posterior probability after an action has been observed is the same as given 
in (3.1), although this only holds in the event a no signal has been observed.36 In the case of 
the receipt of a signal, the market maker will revise his prior probability of the event V V=  
occurring to either 1 or 0 dependent upon the value contained in the signal. That is, 
 
 0
1,  
0,
S if signal V
otherwise
θ ⎧ == ⎨⎩
 (3.23) 
 
This implies that his belief is either completely confident in the high value occurring, or 
completely unconfident about it occurring. In this situation, the market maker will 
automatically adjust his quotes as: 
 
 0 0
,    
Bid Ask
,
S S V if signal V
V otherwise
⎧ == = ⎨⎩
 (3.24) 
 
The revision of quotes if the market maker does not receive a signal, however, is different 
from Model 1 and from that of the GM model. For the market maker to remain risk-neutral 
and act perfectly competitive, his quotes will now need to reflect two pieces of information: 
(1) the probability that the next trade will originate from an informed trader, and (2) the 
probability that he will receive a signal after the next trade. His bid (ask) price will 
therefore form a weighted average according to the expected value conditional upon not 
receiving a signal intersected with a sell (buy), and the expected value conditional upon the
                                                 
36 Similarly, the differentials with respect to μ produce the same result as in equations (3.2) and (3.3). 
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Figure 5 Model 2 Tree Diagram and Market Operation 
 
 
 
 
Tree diagram describing the process of a trade transacting with the market maker, whereθ  is the probability of a high value of V occurring, α  is the probability 
that the market maker receives a signal, μ  is the probability that a trade originates from an informed trader, γ is the probability that an uninformed trader is a 
buyer. Nodes to the left of the dotted line occur only at the beginning of the trading day; nodes to the right are repeated during the trading interval. Thus, there is 
a possibility that the market maker will receive a correct signal after each trade is completed.
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receipt of a signal in the next period. However, at any time t, the expected value conditional 
upon the receipt of a signal at time 1t +  is not known ex-ante to the market maker; hence, 
this expectation will in fact become the unconditional expectation of value at time t: 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
*
Pr Pr
Pr Pr since ,   are independent
=
C C
t t t t
C C
t t
C
E V S E E V S S E V S
V V S V V S
V V V V V S
V
+ +⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
= +
= +
 (3.25) 
 
Hence, the market maker’s initial zero expected profit bid and ask quotes conditional upon 
not receiving a signal will now become: 
 
 
( )
( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 1
0
0 0
Bid 1 Sell
1 Sell
1 Pr Sell Pr 1 Pr Sell Pr
CS C
C
C C
E V S E V S
E V S E V
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α α
α α α α
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∩
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 (3.26) 
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C
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E V S E V S
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α α α α
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⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + + − +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
∩
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 (3.27)
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The spread is, therefore, defined as, 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
0 0 0
0 0
0 0
0
Spread Ask Bid
1 Pr Buy Pr Buy
1 Pr Sell Pr Sell
1 Spread
C C CS S S
C C
C C
GM
V V S V V S
V V S V V S
α
α
α
= −
= − +
− −
= −
∩ ∩
∩ ∩
 (3.28) 
 
These quotes are fundamentally different to those initially found in equations (3.6) and 
(3.7) as they now reflect the expectation of value given that the market maker may receive 
a completely confident signal in the next round of trade. This is, therefore, consistent with 
research by Amihud and Mendelson (2000) and Nimalendran and Petrella (2003), in which 
the market maker’s quotations are directly related to an agreement set with the firm. That 
is, the firm is effectively subsidising the possible losses of the market maker with the 
possibility that he will become fully informed at some point in the future. It is interesting 
that the initial spread actually decreases to a proportion of the spread that occurs in the GM 
model. This is further explored in Section 5.  
 
3.3.2 Model 2 – Dynamics of Beliefs and Prices 
The main difference between this model and Model 1 is that here the market maker’s 
beliefs not only depend on the most recent trader action, but also whether or not he has 
received a signal. Since he gains no information about the no-signal case, then this situation 
will reduce his posterior beliefs to that defined by the GM model. The case in which he 
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does receive a signal will cause him to adjust completely his belief according to the 
message contained in the signal. 
 
Since there is a certain probability of this occurring, it is postulated that convergence will 
be quicker in this situation. However, this is examined more thoroughly in Section 4. 
Hence, at any given time k, the market maker’s posterior probability, given trader actions 
and signals up to that point, will form a combination of indicator functions: 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 1 2
0
1 2
0 0
1 2
1
2
Pr Pr
Pr
Pr
Pr Pr
Pr
if is true
Pr if is true
k k
k
k
S S C S
A A k k i
C V
k S
iC V C V
k k
GM S
A i
GM
A
S
i
V S A V
V S
V
V S V S
V
V
θ θ θ
π θπ π
θ θ
θ
θ
Ω Ω
−= +
= ++
= +
⎧⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
∩ ∩
∩
∩ ∩
I I
I I
I I
I
I
 (3.29) 
( ) ( ) ( )1 11 2
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Pr , ,
1  
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k k
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V C S S S S
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i
where A V S
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otherwise
π θ θ θ θΩ Ω− −== = ∉ = ∈
⎧= = ⎨⎩
∏ ∩ I I I I
I
 
 
Thus, using (3.29), the market maker’s zero-expected profit bid and ask prices at time 
1t k= − are defined as, 
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 (3.31) 
 
It is interesting to note that the component with coefficient ( )1 α−  in equations (3.30) and 
(3.31) is actually the equivalent bid and ask prices at that point in time under the GM 
model. The implication of this is that in this model, the market maker’s prices will not be as 
affected given any trader action. That is, the effect a buy or a sell have on the market 
maker’s prices will be reduced by an amount equal to ( )1 α− . The reason for this is, as 
stated previously, he is discounting into his prices the probability of becoming fully 
informed after the next trade. It must be stressed, however, that this is not the same for his 
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posterior beliefs, he is still adjusting his belief of the true value of an asset given certain 
trader actions. 
 
The market maker’s spread at this particular point in time will, therefore, be defined as, 
 
 
( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
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−
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− −
−
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= − + + − +
− − + + − +
= − − − + −
= − +
⎧ −⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
I I
I I
I I
I I
I
I  (3.32) 
 
The reason why the spread can be defined in terms of the spread under the GM model is 
that the market maker’s posterior as defined in (3.29) will reduce to the GM Model’s 
posterior as long as he never receives a signal.
 
 
Although the spread still retains its convexity around the unconditional expected value of 
the asset, the size of the spread will be proportionately lessened, due to this expectation that 
the market maker may receive a signal in the future. The magnitude of this reduction in 
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spread size is proportional to the probability of receiving a signal. This next section will 
illustrate this model as an example.
 
 
3.3.3 A Possible Example  
This example uses the same trading sequence and parameter set as used in the example 
described in Section 3.2.3, although in this example the signal quality is assured and three 
varying probabilities for the receipt of a signal are used, specifically α = {0, 0.4, 0.6}. As 
such, there is no signal received for the first price path, the second path randomly drew a 
signal at 4t = , whilst the third randomly drew a signal at 2t = .  
 
Thus, the sequence of signals are defined as follows: { }0 0 1 2 3 4 5, , , , ,C C C C C CS S S S S Sα=Σ = , 
{ }0.4 0 1 2 3 4, , , ,C C C CS S S S Sα=Σ = and { }0.6 0 1 2, ,C CS S Sα =Σ = . Using equations (3.30) and (3.31), 
the market maker’s bid and ask prices and the price path is described in Figure 6. 
 
There are two striking differences between the paths that have a possibility of receiving a 
signal and the path that has zero possibility of receiving a signal. The first is that the spread 
size is now reduced with respect to the proportion of the possibility of receiving a signal, 
α .  
 
This reflects the market maker’s competitive behaviour, in that he will price his bid and ask 
quotes such that the expected profit on any trade is equal to the expected loss conditional 
upon the receipt of a signal after the next round of trade. The second point to note is that as 
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α  increases, so does the speed at which prices converge to the true value, which is V =
100 here. Further examples of this model are presented in Section 5. 
 
Figure 6 An Example of Various Price Paths in Model 2  
 
 
Bid and ask price paths under the parameter values previously defined. α represents the price path upon 
a certain probability of receiving a signal. The GM bid and ask are synonymous to the case whereby 
α = 0. Values given in parenthesis represent the market maker’s price given the most recent trade 
action. 
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4. Comparisons to Glosten and Milgrom (1985)Equation Chapter (Next) Section 1
 
In this section, explicit comparison is drawn between the models previously mentioned and 
the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) case. In this way, explicit comparison between informed 
and uninformed market makers can be made so as to highlight any potential benefits or 
detriments that may arise from becoming informed. 
 
4.1 Model 1 Comparisons 
 
Proposition 4. Initial spread is smaller upon the receipt of a signal. 
 
Proof: As previously discussed, since the market maker’s prior probability of the 
asset’s value is conditional upon the receipt of a signal, the case in which he does not 
receive a signal reduces the model down to the GM model. As such, this section does not 
consider that possibility for this proposition, and only examines the cases in which the 
market maker does receive a signal (either high or low, denoted by S). 
 
In the analysis that follows, to keep the complex notation as clean as possible, and the result 
as easy as possible to comprehend, the following parameters are fixed at values that would 
pertain to real market conditions. Specifically, let 0.5, 0.5, 1, 0V Vθ γ= = = = . Thus, the 
spread for a high or low signal as generally defined by (3.8) will both reduce to the 
following; 
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 ( )( )01 0 0 22
4 1
Spread Ask Bid
1 1 2
S S S
M
δ δμ
μ δ
−= − = − −  (4.1) 
 
In the case for the GM model, the spread as defined by the difference between the marker 
maker’s ask and bid price defined by (2.7) and (2.8) will reduce to the following under the 
certain parameter restrictions, 
 
 ,0 ,0 ,0Spread Ask BidGM GM GM μ= − =  (4.2) 
 
The difference between the two spreads at time 0t =  is, therefore, evaluated as, 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )0 0
2 2
1 22
1 2 1
= Spread Spread
1 1 2
S S
GM MD
μ δ μ
μ δ
− −− = − −  (4.3) 
 
The derivative of this initial spread with respect to the quality of the signal will thus give 
insight into how this difference changes with a varying quality. Specifically, (see Appendix 
A.9 for the long form),  
 
 
0
0  0.5 1
SD for δδ
∂ > < ≤∂  (4.4) 
 
 
0
0  0 0.5
SD for δδ
∂ < ≤ <∂  (4.5) 
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Equation (4.4) mathematically confirms the intuition that, for any given signal, whether it is 
high or low, when the confidence of signal correctness increases from the minimum case of 
0.5δ =  towards 1, then the difference in spreads also increases. That is, the difference is an 
increasing function with respect to δ , where the maximum is defined at 1 and minimum at 
0. Similarly the intuition behind equation (4.5) is that the difference in spreads becomes 
larger as the quality of the signal moves away from its minimum informational value of 
0.5δ = . Thus, it now becomes a decreasing function with respect to the quality of the 
signal with a minimum at 0.5 and maximum at 0. Hence, the global maxima and minima 
are found at { }0, 1δ =  and 0.5δ = , respectively. This is graphically portrayed in Figure 7 
below. 
 
 
Figure 7 is interesting as it highlights not only that the difference in spreads increases as δ
moves away from 0.5, but also that for a particular level of μ  in the GM model, there 
exists a certain δ  and a new μ  for which that difference in spreads will be zero. What this 
implies is that with an increasingly confident signal, the market maker is able to subject 
himself to a higher proportion of informed trading in the market. This new level of μ  can 
be found by solving for when equation (4.2) is equal to equation (4.3). If the proportion of 
informed traders in the GM market is defined as GMμ , then for any 0.5δ ≠ , the new 
proportion of informed traders, μ , that the market maker can subject himself to is equated 
as, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 22
2
2 1 4 1 2
1 2
GM GM
GM
δ δ δ δ μ δμμ μ δ
− − + − + −= −  (4.6) 
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Figure 7 Model 1 vs. GM Model - Initial Difference in Spreads 
 
 
 
Difference in spreads for any given level of μ  and δ . The y-axis denotes the difference in spreads whilst the x-axis denotes the proportion of informed traders in the market. 
The maximum values of μ  and the difference in spreads for a chosen level of δ  are given in the red parentheses. The difference in spreads increases as δ  moves away from 
0.5 with a global maximum at { }0, 1δ = . Note also that 0.5θ =  and 0.5γ = .
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It must be stressed however, that the ability of the market maker to quote narrower spreads 
given a certain level of δ  in a dynamic setting will depend upon certain other conditions. 
Specifically, not only will the difference be dependent upon the quality of the initial signal, 
as well as its direction, but also upon the number of buys and sells recently observed by the 
market maker. Thus, using equations (3.20), the market maker’s spread given a high and 
low signal after b buys and s sells will be defined by the reduced equations (4.7) and (4.8) 
respectively, 
 
 
( )( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
0 0 0
1, , , ,
2
2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2
Spread Ask Bid
4 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S S S
M b s b s b s
b s
b s s b b s
δμ δ μ
δ δ μ μ μ δ μ μ δ μ μ
+
+
= −
− −=
− + − + − − + + − − +
 (4.7) 
 
 
( )( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
0 0 0
1, , , ,
2
2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2
Spread Ask Bid
4 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S S S
M b s b s b s
b s
b s s b b s
δμ δ μ
δ δ μ μ μ δ μ μ δ μ μ
+
+
= −
− −=
− + − + − − − + + − +
 (4.8) 
 
The spread if the market maker does not receive a signal, or for the case of the GM model, 
will also be defined as, 
 
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
, , , , , ,
2
2 2 2 22 2 2
Spread Ask Bid
4 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GM b s GM b s GM b s
b s
b s s b b s
μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ μ μ
+
+
= −
−=
+ − + − − + + − +
 (4.9) 
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The size of this difference in spreads, defined as 0 0, , , 1, ,D =Spread Spread
S S
b s GM b s M b s− if the 
market maker receives a high signal and 0 0, , , 1, ,D =Spread Spread
S S
b s GM b s M b s−  if he receives a 
low signal will now be dependent upon the combined effects of , , , andb s δ μ . This is 
described in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Difference in spreads between Model 1 and GM after b buys and s sells 
  Direction of Difference 
Parameters  0,
S
b sD  
0
,
S
b sD  
, 0.5b s δ> >   + - 
, 0.5b s δ> <   - + 
, 0.5s b δ> >   - + 
, 0.5s b δ> <   + - 
 
A positive difference indicates that the spread defined by the GM model is larger than the spread 
defined by Model 1, given b buys and s sells and the other specific parameters, whilst a negative 
difference suggests that the spread for the GM model is smaller than that defined by Model 1. The 
magnitudes of the positive differences increase as μ  increases, whilst the magnitudes of the negative 
differences decrease as μ  increases. 0,Sb sD  represents the difference between a spread conditional upon 
the receipt of a high signal and the GM model, whilst 0,
S
b sD  represents the difference between a spread 
conditional upon the receipt of a low signal and the GM model. 
 
Table 2 illustrates the differences in spread sizes between the GM model and Model 1 after 
any total number of trades, n, where n b s= + . Focusing on the case where the market 
maker receives a high signal, the spread in the GM model is greater than the spread in 
Model 1 under the conditions where the number of buys is greater (smaller) than the 
number of sells and the signal has a high (low) probability of being correct. This reflects 
the fact that the market maker has increased confidence in his pricing, given the signal, and 
given the direction of trade. Conversely, the market maker is less confident in his pricing 
when he prices in the correct (incorrect) direction of his received signal and the number of 
buys is less than (greater than) the number of sells observed. These differences become 
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larger (smaller) as the proportion of informed traders in the market increases, when the 
direction of the difference is positive (negative). This means that the market maker 
becomes more (less) confident in his signal as he extracts more information from a given 
trade as the proportion of informed trading increases. Therefore, there could exist cases in 
which the market maker has a wider spread than the GM model even if he receives a correct 
signal.  
 
As previously stated, since the spread is a convex function and it decreases in size as it 
approaches one of the true values, then in the analysis described, an increased difference in 
spread size must mean that one of the models is approaching the true value more quickly 
than another. If this is true, then it can be used to ascertain that the mean difference in 
spreads, for a certain given sequence of trades, would have to be smaller under a correct 
signal. This is further explored in Section 5. Proposition 5 below gives a formal proof for 
definition of this speed of convergence under a correct or incorrect signal. 
 
Proposition 5. Convergence is quicker if the market maker receives either a correct 
signal with 0.5δ >  or an incorrect signal with 0.5δ < . 
 
Proof: See Appendix A.10 for full proof. 
 
This proof is achieved by comparing the KL Divergences of probabilities between the cases 
in which the market maker does not receive a signal and those in which he does. The use of 
this method is appropriate since, as shown in Proposition 3 of Section 3, the rate of 
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convergence forms an exponential with respect to the KL Divergence between the process 
of trade. Therefore, since this process of trade does not change across models, comparison 
in the rate of convergence can be achieved by comparing the prior beliefs of the market 
maker to a fixed posterior belief; the latter is defined as a parameter in which the market 
maker becomes completely confident about the true value of the asset. The confidence 
parameter, for the belief that a high value has occurred, is arbitrarily defined as Hθ . Thus in 
the case of a high signal, 
 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )( )
D ||Pr D ||Pr
0  0.51
ln ln
0  0.51 1 1
H H
KL KL
H
V V S
If
If
θ θ
δδδθ δδ θδ θ δ
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ > >− ⎧= + ⎨⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ < <− + − − ⎩⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (4.10) 
 
This is graphically observed in Figure 8 below. 
 
As 1θ →  this difference becomes smaller, which suggests that the benefit a correct signal 
will give to the market maker is limited. It is interesting that the differences are almost 
linear when 0.5δ >  yet become more concave as 0.5δ < . This analysis then suggests that 
the convergence is significantly impaired when the market maker receives a high signal 
with a very low probability. The intuition behind this is that if he knows the probability of 
receiving a correct value is very low, then no matter what signal he does receive, he will 
signal with a high probability of being correct since this is symmetric to the case of 
receiving a correct signal with a low probability of being correct. 
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Figure 8 Difference in Convergence between No Signal and a Correct Signal and 
No Signal and an Incorrect Signal 
 
 
 
The confidence parameter is 0.99Hθ = . The y-axis represents the difference between the two Kullback-
Leibler divergences whilst the x-axis represents the quality of the signal, δ . Three different values of θ  
are considered: {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. The difference becomes smaller as the probability of a high asset value 
increases. If the difference is positive, this reflects the fact that ( ) ( )KL KLD DcS S> , which thus means 
that the convergence to the true value is slower under the case of a no signal.  
 
 
In consequence, the penalty to the market maker’s price adjustments when he receives an 
incorrect signal with a high probability of being correct are greater than the benefits of 
receiving a correct signal under the same probability. Hence, this leads to the following 
corollary: 
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Corollary 1:  Convergence is significantly slower when the market maker receives a 
correct (incorrect) signal with ( )0.5 0.5δ δ< >  as compared to the 
convergence if he receives a correct (incorrect) signal with 
( )0.5 0.5δ δ> < . 
 
Proof:  See Appendix A.11 for full proof. 
 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )2 11
||Pr ||Pr
||Pr ||Pr
0,11ln 0
0,1 , 0.51 2 1 1
H H
KL KL
H H
KL KL
D V D V S
D V D V S
θ θ
θ θ
θ
δ δθ δ δ θ θ−−
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − =⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ∀ ∈= <⎢ ⎥ ∀ ∈ ≠− + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (4.11) 
 
 
This implies that if there are two markets, one in which the market maker receives a high 
signal and the other in which the market maker receives a low signal, then the net effect 
will be decreased convergence. This is graphically demonstrated in Figure 9 below. 
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Figure 9 Difference in Convergence between Correct Signal and an Incorrect 
Signal 
 
 
 
The confidence parameter is 0.99Hθ = . The y-axis represents the difference between the two Kullback-
Leibler divergences whilst the x-axis represents the quality of the signal, δ . Three different values of θ  
are considered: {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. Since the differences are negative for all δ ≠ 0.5, then this reflects the 
fact that convergence under an incorrect signal is significantly slower than that under a correct signal.  
 
However, to analyse the mean effect of receiving any signal as compared to no signal, the 
expected divergence is found from receiving a signal and this is then compared to the 
divergence in the case where no signal is received.  Thus the next proposition is put 
forward,  
 
Proposition 6. The expected convergence under a signal will be quicker than the 
convergence for the GM model (or in the case of a no signal). 
 
Proof: See Appendix A.12. 
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The proof requires finding the bounds on: 
 
 [ ] ( ) ( )D DGM E SKL KL KLD GM E S− = − ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (4.12) 
 
In the appendix, it is proved that, 
 [ ] ( )2 1 0
0.5
GM E S GM S
KL KLD D
θδ δ
− − ∀⎡ ⎤= − >⎣ ⎦ ∀ ≠  (4.13) 
 
This implies that when the market maker receives any signal that is informative, 
convergence, on average, will be faster than in the case in which he does not receive a 
signal. Thus, even though the market will be significantly hindered when the market maker 
prices his quotes incorrectly from his signal, the market on average will be better off. 
Graphically, this is displayed in Figure 10 below. 
 
The difference in the rate of convergence is dependent upon the probability of a high value 
occurring in expectation terms. As the probability of a high value occurring increases, the 
benefit of receiving a signal, in convergence terms, is weakened but still positive. This 
suggests that for a particular asset which has an uncertain payoff, with an unknown 
probability of occurring, then an assigned market maker who has any partial information 
will be able to discover the price of that asset more quickly than otherwise. As such, this 
result has important implications for the notion of price discovery.  
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Figure 10 Difference in Convergence between a No Signal and an Expected Signal 
for Model 1 
 
 
 
The confidence parameter is 0.99Hθ = . The y-axis represents the difference between the two Kullback-
Leibler divergences. If this is positive this reflects the fact that ( ) ( )[ ]D DCKL KLS SE> , and hence the 
convergence to the true value is slower under the case of no signal.  
 
4.2 Model 2 Comparisons 
 
Proposition 7. The market maker’s spread in Model 2 will be strictly smaller than 
that in the GM model if there exists a possibility of receiving a signal. 
 
Proof: The market maker’s spread in Model 2 at any time 1t k= − , for any positive 
α , is defined as in equation (3.32). Thus the difference between the spread as defined in 
the GM model and the spread in Model 2 at time 1t k= −  will become: 
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Therefore, 
 
 , 1 2, 1Spread Spread for any 0, and for any 
S
GM k M k S SαΩ Ω− −> > ∈  (4.15) 
 
This proposition intuitively makes sense, since in this case the market maker has no 
uncertainty about the information he receives and thus will price this confidence into his 
quotes. Hence, as compared to Model 1 in which spreads may be worse off, in Model 2 it is 
found that this will never occur. 
 
Proposition 8. Convergence in Model 2 is quicker, on average, than in the GM 
model. 
 
Proof: The proof given here is an ad hoc proof, as a formal proof requires 
calculating the expected KL Divergences for Model 2, which requires evaluation of all 
possible scenarios in which the market maker may receive a signal in the future.  That is, 
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where ( )0,1,..., 1D CKL i iS S− +  is the KL Divergence when the market maker receives a signal 
only at trade event n i=  (this conversely implies that he does not receive a signal for any 
time up until i). Thus, the expectation of this is integrated over the range of possible signal 
sequences with the respective probabilities. It is, therefore, difficult to evaluate 
( )0,1,..., 1D CKL i iS S− + as this becomes a function with respect to the unknown parameter n. 
However it can be noted this divergence will lie within the range of: 
 
 ( ) ( )0,1,..., 1D 0, DCKL i i KLS S GM− + = ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (4.17) 
 
This is because the maximum divergence under Model 2 will be the same as that under the 
GM model, as this reflects equation (3.29)which stated that the posterior at trade event n for 
a sequence of repeated no signals will be the same posterior as at trade event n for the GM 
model. Therefore the implication of (4.17) is that the expected Divergence of (4.16) will lie 
somewhere between these bounds and will be strictly positive for any 0α > . Hence, if this 
is the case, then comparison of KL Divergences against the GM model will yield, 
 
 ( ) ( )D D 2 0KL KLGM E M− >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (4.18) 
 94 
 
Figure 11 below illustrates the difference in KL Divergences over a possible range of KL 
Divergences for Model 2. The expected value thus lies somewhere between the possible 
ranges, where the minimum difference is at 0 whilst the maximum occurs when the market 
maker receives a signal with probability α  before any trade occurs. 
 
Figure 11 Difference in Convergence between the GM model and Model 2 
 
 
 
The confidence parameter is 0.99Hθ = . The y-axis represents the difference between the two Kullback-
Leibler divergences whilst the x-axis represents the probability associated with a high value of the asset 
occurring. If the difference is positive then this reflects the fact that ( ) ( )[ ]D D 2KL KLGM ME> , and hence 
the convergence to the true value is slower under the case of no signal.  
 
The minimum of the divergences is defined at α = 0 and also occurs when the market 
maker’s posterior hits the confidence parameter before the receipt of a signal (which 
therefore reflects the fact that convergence to true value is no worse than the GM model). 
For very high values of α , it can be postulated that the convergence approaches the 
maximum. This difference in convergence is quickest for lower probabilities for a high 
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asset occurring, which is easy to understand since the market would have more confidence, 
in that case, of a low value occurring. This demonstrates that a market maker who is able to 
receive completely confident information over the course of the trading day will be able 
more quickly to restore prices, on average, to their full informational levels. 
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5. Model Simulations 
 
The object of this paper is to study the dynamics of prices and the properties of price 
adjustment under certain specific conditions when the market maker is asymmetrically 
informed. In order to achieve this, it is intended to demonstrate some of the proofs put 
forward in Section 4, and then discuss some of the results as implications. The specific 
issue that this section examines is whether, on average, the market is better off with an 
asymmetrically informed market maker in terms of width of spread and convergence to the 
true value. The analysis performed here is achieved through repeated model simulations. 
 
Model 1 and Model 2, as described in Section 3, were simulated through recreations using 
Microsoft Visual Basic (VBA)37. VBA allowed all probability parameters to be set 
endogenously (see Table 3 and Table 11 for these parameters), with signals, arrival of 
traders, and trader actions randomly drawn from a predetermined distribution.38 
Furthermore, even though the asset could randomly draw either a high or a low value, in 
these simulations the realised draw of the asset’s value is high, which in these simulations 
is set at 100. This means that in every simulation, the informed traders are always going to 
buy the asset. The reason the asset’s value can be constrained as a high value is that the 
model is symmetric for both high and low values of the asset, and fixing the value of the 
asset as a certain outcome allows for cleaner representation of the simulation results across 
differing parameter sets and models.  
                                                 
37 Code is available upon request. 
38 Specifically, the parameters are chosen from a random draw between zero and 1. If the random draw is less 
than or equal to the probability of that parameter occurring then the parameter is set as being true. This 
process, thus, allows for complete randomisation of the realised outcomes for the parameters. 
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As described in Section 3, the market maker revises his beliefs about the asset’s value 
according to recently observed trader actions and upon whether or not he receives a signal. 
In the model simulations, the market maker revises his beliefs in this manner until his 
posterior probability of the asset’s value reaches some predetermined probability, at which 
point he is then considered confident enough of the asset’s true value to adjust his prices to 
that value. In these simulations, this predetermined probability has been set as Hθ = 0.99 
(i.e. he is 99% confident of the outcome of the asset given his signal and recently observed 
trader actions). This predetermined probability is referred to as the market maker’s 
confidence parameter. 
 
The implication of this process is that, for a particular set of parameters, the model will 
repeat the trading sequence until the market maker’s posterior probability reaches Hθ . The 
time during which this occurs will depend upon three main events: the proportion of 
informed trading in the market; the probability of receiving a signal; and finally the 
probability that a received signal is correct.  
 
Each particular set of parameters is referred to as a combination. A trial is referred to as one 
run of the model for that specific set of parameters. One trial is completed when the market 
maker’s posterior hits the confidence parameter and convergence is achieved. Thus, in any 
one trial there may be any number of trades until convergence, dependent upon the random 
draws of informed traders, trade direction and signals. In order to diminish the effect on the 
overall results of a trial occurring in which the uninformed actions are completely one-
sided, or in which there happens to be no draw of informed traders, each trial is repeated 
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10,000 times, so as to provide a true representation of the parameter distributions. This 
allows for analysis of the mean inter-temporal effects on the spread and price path 
dynamics for a particular combination. All simulations are also compared to the base case, 
defined here as the GM model.39 
 
5.1 Model 1 Simulations 
 
Several simulations were performed on Model 1 with the market as described in Section 3. 
That is, at the opening of the day the market maker may or may not receive a signal with a 
probability as defined by the parameter α ; the probability that he gives to the correctness 
of the signal is defined by the parameter δ . There are specific issues that are addressed 
through varying these, and other, parameters. Firstly, what do spreads and price paths look 
like if the market maker receives correct or incorrect signals with varying probability δ , 
and consequently what is the overall average effect on spreads and convergence? Secondly, 
how does varying the probability parameter of receiving a signal affect the market on 
average? The final issue that is addressed in this section is how the proportion of informed 
traders, μ , affects the width of the spread and the speed of adjustment under differing 
signal quality parameters. The variation of μ  will therefore  allow for analysis of the effect 
of the signal a market maker receives in terms of spread size and price efficiency. 
 
Since these aforementioned parameters are the ones that are relevant to the issues to be 
addressed in this paper, the following parameters are fixed throughout all simulations. The 
                                                 
39 There has been no allowance for comparison between Model 1 and Model 2, as the number of permutations 
in varying the information parameters would be too large. General comparison is drawn at the end of this 
section and discussion is made in Section 6. 
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probability of a high value of the asset occurring is fixed at θ =0.5.40 The probability of an 
uninformed action (either a buy or sell) is also fixed at γ = 0.5. This means that the 
uninformed traders do not have a stronger preference buying or selling the asset, which 
means that, as described in Section 3, there is an equal probability of a liquidity shock 
occurring to the uninformed trader. That is, the consumption parameter has an equally 
likely chance of being 0ρ =  or ρ = ∞ . The behaviour of these uninformed traders will 
thus correspond to the usual noise trading as observed in market microstructure literature. 
The other parameters are fixed at varying values under certain conditions as shown in Table 
3 below. 
 
Table 3 Model 1 Simulation Parameters 
 Simulations 
Parameters Comparing Effects on Signals Overall Effects 
 1 2 3 
V =  V  V  V  
θ =  0.5 0.5 0.5 γ =  0.5 0.5 0.5 α =  1.0 1.0 {0.5, 1.0} 
δ =  {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9} {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9} {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0} 
S =  S  (incorrect signal) S  (correct signal) { }, ,CS S S  
μ =  {0.3, 0.5, 0.7} {0.3, 0.5, 0.7} {0.3, 0.5, 0.7}
 
Model parameter values for specific simulation. The true value is always set at V which is 100. The 
probability of an uninformed action, denoted by γ , is set at 0.5. The probability of receiving a signal is 
denoted as α . The probability the market maker assigns to the correctness of a received signal is 
denoted by δ . A signal is correct if it contains the high value of the asset, denoted by S . A signal is 
incorrect if it contains the low value of the asset, denoted by S . The proportion of informed trading is 
represented by the parameter μ .  
 
There are three general simulations analysed, as described in Table 3. The first two 
examine the situation in which the market maker always receives a signal. This is divided 
into cases in which the signal he receives is either always incorrect (simulation 1) or always 
                                                 
40 The variation of this parameter will not affect the results found here; it will only speed up or slow down the 
price adjustment process as seen in Section 4, Figures 8, 9 and 10. 
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correct (simulation 2). The market maker does not know whether he has received a correct 
or incorrect signal, but places emphasis on it being correct, according to the probability 
parameter δ . Note that the possible range of values for δ  is between 0.5 and 0.9. The 
value of 1.0 is not analysed, since these simulations intend only to analyse the different 
levels of confidence the market maker has in his signal. As such, a value of 1.0 gives the 
market maker complete confidence, in which case he would automatically revise his beliefs 
to the true value before any trades occur. This value therefore would give no insight into 
the price revision process. In addition, the reason there are no values of δ  below 0.5 is that 
the results will be symmetric around the value of 0.5 (as discussed in Section 3.2.4) and 
hence the results following a correct signal, with parameter δ , will be the same as those 
following a incorrect signal with parameter 1 δ− .  
 
The third simulation analyses the overall effects when either a high, low or no signal may 
be received by the market maker with varying probabilities of them being correct. Analysis 
of this simulation is, therefore, able to provide the mean effects of receiving correct or 
incorrect signals. The probability of receiving a signal in these simulations varies from 0.5 
to 1.0. In all simulations, the proportion of informed traders ranges in values of 0.3, 0.5 and 
0.7. 10,000 trials for each particular parameter combination were run. 
 
5.1.1 Simulations 1 & 2 - Comparing Correct to Incorrect Signals 
It was found in Section 4 that the marker maker’s beliefs should converge more quickly to 
the true value if he receives a correct signal with a probability greater than 0.5, with spreads 
smaller on average than in the base case of the GM model. Similarly, if he receives an 
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incorrect signal with a probability of being correct greater than 0.5, then convergence 
should be hindered and spreads should be wider on average. However, it is interesting to 
analyse numerically how much this adjustment process is hindered, and how much wider 
are these spreads.  
 
In order to analyse the effects on mean spreads and the general properties of the price path 
under situations in which the market maker may receive either a correct or an incorrect 
signal, the following simulations fix the receipt of a signal being sent out to the market 
maker as being either correct or incorrect. Thus, in one simulation the market maker always 
receives correct signals, and in another he always receives incorrect signals, both with 
varying degrees of δ . The market maker still does not know whether he has received a 
correct or an incorrect signal, however; he only knows δ : the probability of it being 
correct. Figures 12, 13 and 14 demonstrate the mean price paths forμ = 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, 
respectively. The A panels further explore the cases when δ =0.6 and 0.7, and the GM base 
case. The B panels then examine δ =0.8 and 0.9 compared to the GM base case, 
similarly.41 
 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the mean spreads under each value of δ . 
Panels A, B and C similarly examine the mean spreads for μ = 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, 
                                                 
41 Note that analysis on the mean spreads and mean number of trials only needs to be examined and as such 
no data filtering needs to be done. There are two reasons for this: firstly, there are no outliers in the data since 
the model is generated from clean simulations; secondly the reason for the simulations was to analyse the 
randomness that may occur under the models, and as such, all extreme values are welcomed. More 
practically, to remove any data, or to only look at the quantiles would give biased results. For example, 
consider the case when δ = 0.9 and the market maker receives an incorrect signal. As seen in the following 
analysis, this would result in increased spreads and decreased convergence. Therefore, removing the top 5% 
of the data would effectively remove any cases in which the market maker received an incorrect signal and 
this would then bias the results. 
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respectively. Pooled t-statistics comparing the group means of a particular δ  with the GM 
base case are also given with their respective p-values.  
 
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics for the mean number of trades until convergence 
under each value of δ . Panels A, B and C similarly look at the mean spreads for μ = 0.3, 
0.5 and 0.7, respectively. Pooled t-statistics comparing the mean number of trades until 
convergence of a particular δ  with the GM base case are also given with their respective p-
values. 
 
An examination of the graphs reveals first that as the market maker receives an increasingly 
correct signal, δ , convergence to the true value becomes quicker. Moreover, the size of the 
spread, at any given point in time, seems smaller when compared to the base case of the 
GM model. As identified in Table 4 and Table 5, these results are statistically significant 
for most values of δ  not equal to 0.5.  
 
Conversely, under the cases in which the market maker receives incorrect signals, the 
speed of adjustment to true value decreases as the probability of a correct signal, δ , 
increases. This reflects the fact that the market maker has received an incorrect signal on 
the odd chance, which hinders the adjustment process. It can be observed in the graphs that 
spreads, although initially narrower than in the base case of the GM model, become wider 
during the price adjustment process. The mean spread is significantly larger in each trial, as 
observed in Table 4, and the price adjustment process is significantly slower, as observed in 
Table 5.  
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Figure 12 Model 1 - Correct and Incorrect Price Paths for μ =0.3 
 
Panel A: Correct and Incorrect Signal Paths for δ = 0.6, 0.7 
 
 
Panel B: Correct and Incorrect Signal Paths for δ = 0.8, 0.9 
 
Average bid and ask price paths when the proportion of informed traders in the market is μ = 0.3. 
The probability of receiving a signal is α = 1. S  represents the price path upon receipt of a high 
(correct) signal. S  represents the price path upon receipt of a low (incorrect) signal. Various 
levels of signal correctness, δ , are given and plotted against the base-case GM model. 
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Figure 13 Model 1 - Correct and Incorrect Price Paths for μ =0.5 
 
Panel A: Correct and Incorrect Signal Paths for δ = 0.6, 0.7 
 
 
Panel B: Correct and Incorrect Signal Paths for δ = 0.8, 0.9 
 
Average bid and ask price paths when the proportion of informed traders in the market is μ = 0.5. 
The probability of receiving a signal is α = 1. S  represents the price path upon receipt of a high 
(correct) signal. S  represents the price path upon receipt of a low (incorrect) signal. Various 
levels of signal correctness, δ , are given and plotted against the base-case GM model. 
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Figure 14 Model 1 – Correct and Incorrect Average Price Paths for μ =0.7 
 
Panel A: Correct and Incorrect Signal Paths for δ = 0.6, 0.7 
 
 
Panel B: Correct and Incorrect Signal Paths for δ = 0.8, 0.9 
 
Average bid and ask price paths when the proportion of informed traders in the market is μ = 0.7. 
The probability of receiving a signal is α = 1. S  represents the price path upon receipt of a high 
(correct) signal. S  represents the price path upon receipt of a low (incorrect) signal. Various 
levels of signal correctness, δ , are given and plotted against the base-case GM model. 
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As is also expected, as the proportion of informed trading increases, the number of trades 
taken for convergence is significantly decreased. This is because each trader action has a 
greater amount of price impact on the market maker’s prices (as stated in Section 3) since 
the market maker is able to extract extra information out of each trade.  
 
By inspection, it seems that that the graphs provide support for Proposition 5 and Corollary 
1, in that the incorrect signals impede the price adjustment process by a greater amount than 
the facilitation of this process under correct signals. This is further examined in the tables 
below. 
 
As expected, the difference in mean spreads is insignificant at δ =0.5, signifying the 
market maker is no better or worse off if he receives a signal with 50% probability of being 
correct as opposed to the base case where no signal is received, as demonstrated in Section 
4. For all other values of this parameter (except for δ = 0.6 when μ =0.5) the differences 
are significant, demonstrating that when a market maker receives a correct (incorrect) 
signal, the spread in the market is significantly narrower (wider), on average, when 
compared to the base case of the GM model. These results become increasingly significant 
for increasing levels of δ  indicating increased or decreased confidence in the signal when 
the market maker receives a correct or incorrect signal, respectively.  
 
What is surprising, however, is that the maximum mean spreads under an incorrect signal 
for μ = 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7 occur at δ = 0.7, 0.7 and 0.9 respectively. This is counterintuitive, 
as one might expect the maximum mean spreads always to occur at δ = 0.9. One possible
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Table 4 Model 1 Mean Spreads 
Panel A: μ = 0.3 
Incorrect Signal Correct Signal 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 13.61 3.76 4.85 25.08 GM 13.61 3.76 4.85 25.08 
δ = 0.5 13.62 3.79 4.14 24.77 0.04 0.96 δ = 0.5 13.67 3.77 5.06 24.77 1.14 0.26 
δ = 0.6 13.90 3.51 4.53 24.65 5.57 0.00 δ = 0.6 13.21 3.93 5.50 24.53 -7.43 0.00 
δ = 0.7 15.20 3.23 5.34 24.98 32.09 0.00 δ = 0.7 11.04 4.18 4.03 23.98 -45.82 0.00 
δ = 0.8 15.06 3.11 4.93 24.55 29.57 0.00 δ = 0.8 9.43 4.15 3.02 24.19 -74.75 0.00 
δ = 0.9 14.85 3.20 3.33 24.56 25.14 0.00 δ = 0.9 7.03 3.77 2.75 23.55 -123.69 0.00 
Panel B: μ = 0.5 
Incorrect Signal Correct Signal 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 20.61 5.08 8.09 35.49   GM 20.61 5.08 8.09 35.49   
δ = 0.5 20.67 5.09 8.09 36.77 0.89 0.37 δ = 0.5 20.62 5.09 8.09 35.49 0.23 0.82 
δ = 0.6 22.72 4.71 9.86 36.68 30.54 0.00 δ = 0.6 20.71 5.30 9.40 38.38 1.45 0.15 
δ = 0.7 24.58 4.19 11.70 38.04 60.34 0.00 δ = 0.7 17.53 5.63 7.11 36.20 -40.51 0.00 
δ = 0.8 23.33 4.23 10.50 37.05 41.17 0.00 δ = 0.8 16.05 5.73 7.79 37.10 -59.5 0.00 
δ = 0.9 22.07 4.28 8.55 35.49 21.99 0.00 δ = 0.9 9.99 5.29 4.00 34.25 -144.64 0.00 
              
Panel C: μ = 0.7 
Incorrect Signal Correct Signal 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 29.13 4.85 17.00 47.99   GM 29.13 4.85 17.00 47.99   
δ = 0.5 29.07 4.78 15.72 47.99 -0.85 0.39 δ = 0.5 29.03 4.76 14.50 47.99 -1.44 0.15 
δ = 0.6 30.54 4.65 17.29 48.17 21.02 0.00 δ = 0.6 25.99 5.24 14.13 48.12 -44.07 0.00 
δ = 0.7 29.83 4.57 15.51 47.00 10.5 0.00 δ = 0.7 22.52 5.57 10.24 46.67 -89.63 0.00 
δ = 0.8 30.37 4.30 16.20 47.78 19.15 0.00 δ = 0.8 22.32 5.92 14.31 48.56 -89.09 0.00 
δ = 0.9 32.25 4.09 14.20 49.07 49.27 0.00 δ = 0.9 14.68 5.90 7.89 42.31 -189.3 0.00 
 
Mean spread for the case in which the market maker receives an incorrect signal and the case in 
which he receives a correct signal for probability parameter δ . The mean spreads were calculated 
across the 10,000 trials. Pooled t-tests across group means are performed to examine the difference 
in spreads against the base case of the GM model. The respective t-statistic and its relevant p-values 
are shown. The different panels in the tables give the results for the different proportions of 
informed trading in the market. 
 
 
reason for this discrepancy, however, is that, as δ  increases, the market maker’s initial 
spread is going to decrease, whether he receives a correct or an incorrect signal. It is only 
when the proportion of informed trading is low that he is able to quote narrower spreads 
than otherwise. 
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In addition, as expected, the spreads increase across increasing values of μ which reflects 
the increased level of adverse selection in the market. However, what is interesting is that 
the mean spread under a correct signal where δ = 0.9, and μ = 0.7, (14.68), is quite close in 
value to the mean spread of the GM model when μ = 0.3 (13.61). This lends weight to the 
belief that an informed market maker is able to subject himself to an increased proportion 
of informed trading in the market. Using equation (4.6), it can be found that if the 
proportion of informed trading is GMμ = 0.3 in the GM model, and the probability of 
receiving a signal is δ = 0.9, then the market maker is able to subject himself to a new 
proportion of informed trading of μ = 0.625 which almost reflects the proportion of 
informed trading of μ =0.7, as is in this case.  
 
It is also interesting to note that the mean spread for the case when the market maker 
receives an incorrect signal, is not much greater than if he was totally uninformed for all 
values of μ . Although these differences are significant, it suggests that the market is not 
much worse off, in terms of the size of the mean spread, under an incorrect signal. In 
addition, as demonstrated in Figure 12, panel B, the price path under an incorrect signal is 
increasingly more volatile than other price paths, suggesting decreased confidence on the 
market maker’s behalf in knowing the true value of the asset. 
 
Table 5 demonstrates the average number of trades before convergence was achieved for 
certain conditions of δ  and μ . It is interesting to examine not only the mean number of 
trades, but also the maxima. As expected, the number of trades is dependent upon the 
receipt of a correct or an incorrect signal and the difference in convergence to the GM case 
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is insignificant whenever δ = 0.5. This means that for any δ > 0.5, a correct signal will 
achieve convergence faster, whilst an incorrect signal will achieve convergence more 
slowly.42 It can also be pointed out that convergence depends also upon the proportion of 
informed traders in the market. This illustrates that the market maker is able to extract more 
information out of any given trade as μ  increases, and agrees with what was shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
It is interesting that the difference in the speeds of adjustment is insignificant for certain 
parameter values that do not equal the base case. Firstly, when μ = 0.5, the speed of 
adjustment is no worse when the incorrect signal is received with δ = 0.6 or 0.7. Similarly 
when μ = 0.7, the differences are insignificant when δ = 0.6 for both a correct and an 
incorrect signal, and when δ = 0.7 for a correct signal. These results suggest that the signal 
becomes less important when the quality of that signal is only marginal and there is an 
increased proportion of informed trading in the market.  
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that the numerical difference in mean number of 
trades when the market maker receives a correct signal as compared to the GM model is 
larger than the difference in mean number of trades when he receives an incorrect signal as 
compared to the GM model. This is further confirmed by comparing the absolute values of 
the t-statistic: a larger t-statistic implies a greater significance. The t-statistics, for any given 
value of δ , for correct signals are more significant than the corresponding t-statistics for 
incorrect signals. This result is contrary to Proposition 5 and Corollary 1 put forward in 
                                                 
42 It should be noted that for values of δ < 0.5 then the opposite would occur. That is, correct signals would 
achieve convergence more slowly whilst incorrect signals would achieve convergence more quickly. 
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Section 4, which stated that the detrimental effects of incorrect signals for convergence 
should be greater than the benefits of receiving a correct signal.43 
 
In summary, the analysis performed here shows that a market maker receiving a correct 
signal will be in a position to post narrower spreads, and also hasten his convergence to the 
true value. As the proportion of informed traders increases in the market, however, these 
results become less relevant as the market maker is able to extract further information from 
the trade direction and not rely as heavily on a partially correct signal. The results for the 
case when he receives an incorrect signal are interesting also. The detriment to the market, 
by number of trades, from an incorrect signal is greatest when the proportion of informed 
trading decreases. This reflects the fact that it takes longer for him to realise his mistake in 
pricing in the opposite direction. The next section identifies the overall effects of receiving 
a signal, randomly drawn according to the probability parameter δ . 
  
                                                 
43 However, by inspecting the maximum number of trades until convergence, the results in Table 5 agree with 
Proposition 5 since the difference in the maximum number of trades, when an incorrect signal is received 
compared to the base case, is larger than that when a correct signal is received and correspondingly compared 
to the base case. This suggests that this detrimental effect put forward by Proposition 5 may only be found for 
extreme values of δ . 
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Table 5 Model 1 Mean Number of Trades Until Convergence 
Panel A: μ = 0.3 
Incorrect Signal Correct Signal 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 31.64 24.74 9 179 GM 31.64 24.74 9 179 
δ = 0.5 31.77 24.86 9 207 0.36 0.72 δ = 0.5 31.79 25.70 9 177 0.44 0.66 
δ = 0.6 35.36 26.32 10 200 10.30 0.00 δ = 0.6 27.95 24.45 8 174 -10.59 0.00 
δ = 0.7 35.22 26.04 10 208 9.97 0.00 δ = 0.7 27.96 24.34 8 172 -10.61 0.00 
δ = 0.8 38.61 27.13 11 229 18.99 0.00 δ = 0.8 24.67 22.76 7 171 -20.73 0.00 
δ = 0.9 42.24 28.14 12 226 28.29 0.00 δ = 0.9 17.61 19.51 5 167 -44.52 0.00 
Panel B: μ = 0.5 
Incorrect Signal Correct Signal 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 12.23 6.83 6 50   GM 12.23 6.83 6 50   
δ = 0.5 12.18 6.81 6 48 -0.53 0.59 δ = 0.5 12.17 6.78 6 48 -0.65 0.51 
δ = 0.6 12.12 6.76 6 50 -1.15 0.25 δ = 0.6 10.10 6.09 5 45 -23.33 0.00 
δ = 0.7 12.12 6.64 6 60 -1.17 0.24 δ = 0.7 10.12 6.18 5 47 -22.97 0.00 
δ = 0.8 14.12 7.37 7 57 18.83 0.00 δ = 0.8 8.11 5.40 4 50 -47.34 0.00 
δ = 0.9 16.19 7.76 8 58 38.26 0.00 δ = 0.9 8.07 5.42 4 42 -47.79 0.00 
              
Panel C: μ = 0.7 
Incorrect Signal Correct Signal 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 5.60 2.46 4 24   GM 5.60 2.46 4 24   
δ = 0.5 5.60 2.46 4 26 -0.06 0.95 δ = 0.5 5.58 2.42 4 24 -0.57 0.57 
δ = 0.6 5.58 2.42 4 26 -0.46 0.64 δ = 0.6 5.61 2.47 4 28 0.19 0.85 
δ = 0.7 6.96 2.60 5 23 38.06 0.00 δ = 0.7 5.59 2.46 4 24 -0.20 0.84 
δ = 0.8 6.98 2.79 5 25 37.12 0.00 δ = 0.8 4.18 2.11 3 23 -43.86 0.00 
δ = 0.9 6.98 2.75 5 27 37.29 0.00 δ = 0.9 4.20 2.15 3 23 -42.79 0.00 
 
Mean number of trades until convergence is achieved for both the case in which the market maker 
receives an incorrect signal and the case in which he receives a correct signal with signal probability 
parameter δ . The mean number of trades until convergence was calculated across the 10,000 trials. 
Pooled t-tests across group means are performed to examine the difference in the mean number of 
trades against the base case of the GM model. The respective t-statistic and its relevant p-values are 
shown. The different panels in the tables give the results for the different proportions of informed 
trading in the market. 
 
 
5.1.2 Simulation 3 - Overall Spread and Convergence Comparisons 
In the previous section, it was seen that spreads are significantly smaller and beliefs 
converge faster when the market maker receives a correct signal. However, it was also seen 
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that if he receives an incorrect signal, then the market becomes asymmetrically worse off, 
with increased spreads and significantly decreased convergence. Thus, the effects are clear 
when the market maker receives a certain signal, however, what is not clear is the effect on 
width of the spreads and the general price path when the signal is drawn randomly, as in 
Model 1. Proposition 6 in Section 4 theoretically showed that, on average, the convergence 
should be quicker as long as the quality of the signal is not equal to 0.5. Table 2 in 
Proposition 4 was also able to illustrate the effects of the spread under certain conditions 
for a given signal, at any one point in time, however, it only provided an ad hoc approach 
to what the mean spread will be for a given sequence of trades. The first part of this section, 
therefore, clarifies the overall effects by inspection of the mean spread across repeated 
trials. 
 
Figures 15, 16 and 17 show the average price paths for cases when μ = 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7. 
The A panels illustrate the average price paths when the probability of receiving a signal is 
α = 0.5 and the probabilities of the signal being correct are δ =  0.7, 0.9 and 1.0. The other 
cases of δ  are not included, however, significance tests were still performed and these 
results are shown in Table 7 and Table 9 below. The B panels illustrate the average price 
paths when the probability of receiving a signal is α = 1, and for probabilities of 
correctness of δ =0.7, 0.8 and 0.9. As in Section 5.1.1 above, the price path for δ =  1.0 is 
not examined when α = 1 as this would indicate that the market maker is always receiving 
a correct signal and hence his beliefs would automatically converge to their true value. 
Similarly, this case is left out of Table 7 and Table 9. 
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What is first striking about the three figures is that the price paths, when the market maker 
receives a signal, achieve convergence faster than the base case of the GM model. 
Moreover, the convergence is even more significant when α = 1.0 compared to when α =
0.5, which is intuitive since it reflects that, on average, the marker maker is receiving 
signals that are more correct. The next striking element to these figures is that the spread, 
under the conditions of receiving signals, appears to follow the spread of the GM model for 
some time until it diverges off towards the true value. The reason for this may be that, 
although the spread under informed signals starts off more accurate and smaller, during the 
course of the trading day the market maker becomes less confident of his signal, given a 
‘more random’ sequence of trades. However, as the randomness decreases and the number 
of buys starts to overshadow the number of sells, the market maker is quickly able to regain 
his confidence about his signal and achieve convergence more quickly. 
 
Table 6 Model 1 Volatility in Midpoint Returns 
 μ = 0.3 μ = 0.5 μ = 0.7 
Parameter  α = 0.5 α = 1.0 α = 0.5 α = 1.0 α = 0.5 α = 1.0 
GM  42.51% 75.16% 103.05% 
δ = 0.5  42.55% 42.37% 74.93% 75.34% 103.32% 102.58% 
δ = 0.6  42.48% 42.60% 73.99% 72.91% 105.27% 104.33% 
δ = 0.7  43.25% 43.87% 76.01% 76.24% 109.81% 117.25% 
δ = 0.8  43.86% 45.62% 74.09% 74.34% 103.84% 104.67% 
δ = 0.9  44.79% 47.75% 79.19% 86.21% 111.76% 119.83% 
δ = 1.0  42.91% - 74.76% - 107.77% - 
 
The standard deviation of midpoint returns was calculated across the 10,000 trials where the 
midpoint is calculated as Mt = Askt - Bidt. The standard deviations were calculated for all levels of 
δ whilst varying the proportion of informed traders μ and the probability of receiving a signal α . 
The standard deviations for the GM model are also given. 
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When considering the volatility of this model compared to the GM model, one would think 
that increased efficiency would be synonymous with increased volatility. However, as 
Table 6 demonstrates, the volatility for increasing levels of δ  do not differ substantially 
from the volatility found in the GM model. It is only for high levels of δ  and when α = 1.0 
that the volatility in the market starts to differ noticeably to the GM model, i.e. the 
commonly held belief that there is a trade-off between price efficiency and volatility in a 
market only holds up under these extreme values. 
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Figure 15 Model 1 – Overall Average Bid and Ask Price Paths for μ =0.3 
 
Panel A: α = 0.5 and δ = 0.7, 0.9, 1.0 
 
 
Panel B: α = 1.0 and δ = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
 
Average bid and ask price paths when the proportion of informed traders in the market is μ =
0.3. The two panels differ in the probability of receiving a signal, denoted α . The market maker 
may receive either a correct or an incorrect signal according to the signal correctness parameter 
δ . The base-case GM model paths are also given.  
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Figure 16 Model 1 – Overall Average Bid and Ask Price Paths for μ =0.5 
 
Panel A: α = 0.5 and δ = 0.7, 0.9, 1.0 
 
 
Panel B: α = 1.0 and δ = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
 
Average bid and ask price paths when the proportion of informed traders in the market is μ =
0.5. The two panels differ in the probability of receiving a signal, denoted α . The market maker 
may receive either a correct or an incorrect signal according to the signal correctness parameter 
δ . The base-case GM model paths are also given.  
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Figure 17 Model 1 - Overall Average Bid and Ask Price Paths for μ =0.7 
 
Panel A: α = 0.5 and δ = 0.7, 0.9, 1.0 
 
  
Panel B: α = 1.0 and δ = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
 
Average bid and ask price paths when the proportion of informed traders in the market is μ = 0.7. 
The two panels differ in the probability of receiving a signal, denoted α . The market maker may 
receive either a correct or an incorrect signal according to the signal correctness parameter δ . The 
base-case GM model paths are also given. 
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Table 7 Model 1 Mean Spreads Per Trial 
Panel A: μ = 0.3 
α =0.5 α =1.0 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 13.61 3.76 4.85 25.08   GM 13.61 3.76 4.85 25.08 
δ = 0.5 13.63 3.96 4.69 25.16 0.25 0.80 δ = 0.5 13.60 4.08 4.69 24.36 -0.21 0.85 
δ = 0.6 13.58 3.93 4.69 25.09 -0.55 0.58 δ = 0.6 13.44 4.01 4.51 24.61 -3.22 0.00 
δ = 0.7 12.98 4.12 4.20 24.88 -11.38 0.00 δ = 0.7 12.25 4.38 3.99 24.52 -23.59 0.00 
δ = 0.8 12.13 4.54 3.01 24.90 -25.23 0.00 δ = 0.8 10.51 4.59 3.21 23.86 -52.33 0.00 
δ = 0.9 10.64 5.05 2.64 24.15 -47.23 0.00 δ = 0.9 7.73 4.40 2.64 23.11 -101.7 0.00 
δ = 1.0 6.72 7.32 0.00 24.59 -83.77 0.00 
Panel B: μ = 0.5 
α =0.5 α =1.0 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value  Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 20.61 5.08 8.09 35.49   GM 20.61 5.08 8.09 35.49   
δ = 0.5 20.63 5.19 8.01 35.49 0.29 0.77 δ = 0.5 20.59 5.16 8.31 35.49 -0.22 0.83 
δ = 0.6 20.33 5.30 8.31 37.85 -3.91 0.00 δ = 0.6 19.85 5.29 9.40 37.85 -10.34 0.00 
δ = 0.7 19.71 5.75 7.11 36.64 -11.73 0.00 δ = 0.7 19.37 6.17 7.11 37.41 -15.48 0.00 
δ = 0.8 19.01 5.94 7.63 36.25 -20.44 0.00 δ = 0.8 17.75 6.18 7.63 37.10 -35.73 0.00 
δ = 0.9 15.86 7.49 4.00 36.25 -52.39 0.00 δ = 0.9 11.24 6.32 3.98 35.11 -115.5 0.00 
δ = 1.0 10.91 10.98 0.00 36.25 -80.14 0.00        
              
Panel A: μ = 0.7 
α =0.5  α =1.0 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value  Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 29.13 4.85 17.00 47.99   GM 29.13 4.85 17.00 47.99   
δ = 0.5 29.01 5.07 17.00 46.37 -1.79 0.07 δ = 0.5 29.05 5.00 17.00 47.99 -1.18 0.24 
δ = 0.6 28.34 5.31 14.13 48.31 -10.97 0.00 δ = 0.6 28.20 5.62 14.13 48.12 -12.55 0.00 
δ = 0.7 26.45 5.97 11.36 49.08 -34.95 0.00 δ = 0.7 23.98 6.07 11.36 46.84 -66.34 0.00 
δ = 0.8 26.35 6.24 15.64 47.64 -35.2 0.00 δ = 0.8 24.08 6.42 13.18 47.64 -62.81 0.00 
δ = 0.9 22.48 8.82 7.89 46.85 -66.13 0.00 δ = 0.9 16.58 7.76 7.89 43.74 -137.2 0.00 
δ = 1.0 15.03 14.81 0.00 48.34 -90.52 0.00        
 
Mean spread for the case in which the market maker can receive either a correct or incorrect signal 
with probability δ . The mean spreads were calculated across the 10,000 trials. Pooled t-tests across 
group means are performed to examine the difference in spreads against the base case of the GM 
model. The respective t-statistic and its relevant p-values are shown. The different panels in the 
tables give the results for the different proportions of informed trading in the market. 
 
 
The results presented in Table 7 show that if there is a probability of receiving a correct 
signal, and the quality of that signal is not equal to 0.5, then the average spread is 
significantly lower than in the case of not receiving a signal. Hence, even though there is a 
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chance that the market maker could have received some incorrect signals, on average, the 
spreads he posted were narrower than those under the case of not receiving a signal.  
 
It is interesting to compare between different levels of α  for various given values of δ . It 
can be seen that the mean spread is wider when the value of α = 0.5 compared to 1.0. The 
differences become more significant as the signal becomes more correct, that is, as δ  
increases. Table 8 presents the t-statistics between these two cases and it shows increasing 
significance as δ  increases. As is expected, the differences are not significant for δ = 0.5 
 
 
Table 8 Model 1 t-statistics Comparing Mean Spreads for α = 0.5 vs. α = 1.0 
Comparison Variables μ = 0.3 μ = 0.5 μ = 0.7 
α =0.5 vs. α =1.0 t-ratio p-value t-ratio p-value t-ratio p-value 
δ = 0.5 -1.42 0.16 0.5 0.61 -1.28 0.20 
δ = 0.6 2.62 0.01 6.3 0.00 1.84 0.07 
δ = 0.7 12.09 0.00 3.99 0.00 28.98 0.00 
δ = 0.8 25.06 0.00 14.73 0.00 25.38 0.00 
δ = 0.9 43.46 0.00 47.14 0.00 50.18 0.00 
 
Pooled t-tests across group means are performed to examine the difference in spreads for α = 0.5 
against α = 1.0. GM model. The respective t-statistic and its relevant p-values are shown against 
differing levels of μ . 
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Table 9 Model 1 Mean Number of Trades per Trial 
Panel A: μ = 0.3 
α =0.5 α =1.0 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 31.64 24.74 9 179 - - GM 31.64 24.74 9 179 - - 
δ = 0.5 32.04 26.46 9 185 1.12 0.26 δ = 0.5 31.76 25.40 9 171 0.34 0.74 
δ = 0.6 31.29 26.26 8 179 -0.97 0.33 δ = 0.6 30.85 25.27 8 164 -2.23 0.03 
δ = 0.7 30.94 26.41 8 186 -1.93 0.05 δ = 0.7 30.40 25.46 8 170 -3.5 0.00 
δ = 0.8 29.49 25.88 7 179 -6.01 0.00 δ = 0.8 27.14 23.77 7 173 -13.11 0.00 
δ = 0.9 25.70 24.64 5 175 -17.01 0.00 δ = 0.9 19.62 20.95 5 155 -37.07 0.00 
δ = 1.0 16.32 24.11 1 181 -44.33 0.00 
Panel B: μ = 0.3 
α =0.5 α =1.0 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value  Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 12.23 6.83 6 50.00 - - GM 12.23 6.83 6 50 - - 
δ = 0.5 12.19 6.83 6 60.00 -0.41 0.68 δ = 0.5 12.26 6.88 6 50 0.26 0.79 
δ = 0.6 11.50 6.61 5 46.00 -7.75 0.00 δ = 0.6 10.95 6.54 5 62 -13.54 0.00 
δ = 0.7 11.42 6.63 5 50.00 -8.5 0.00 δ = 0.7 10.74 6.35 5 50 -15.96 0.00 
δ = 0.8 10.59 6.79 4 50.00 -17.05 0.00 δ = 0.8 9.20 6.16 4 51 -33.0 0.00 
δ = 0.9 10.42 6.70 4 50.00 -18.97 0.00 δ = 0.9 8.82 6.09 4 60 -37.25 0.00 
δ = 1.0 6.90 7.42 1 46.00 -52.88 0.00        
              
Panel A: μ = 0.3 
α =0.5  α =1.0 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value  Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
GM 5.60 2.46 4 24 - - GM 5.60 2.46 4 24 - - 
δ = 0.5 5.56 2.49 4 22 -1.04 0.30 δ = 0.5 5.57 2.46 4 22 -0.72 0.47 
δ = 0.6 5.59 2.49 4 24 -0.29 0.77 δ = 0.6 5.56 2.41 4 22 -1.01 0.31 
δ = 0.7 5.74 2.52 4 23 4.06 0.00 δ = 0.7 5.97 2.65 4 23 10.29 0.00 
δ = 0.8 5.15 2.55 3 26 -12.6 0.00 δ = 0.8 4.74 2.52 3 27 -24.27 0.00 
δ = 0.9 5.01 2.46 3 24 -16.85 0.00 δ = 0.9 4.45 2.27 3 25 -34.22 0.00 
δ = 1.0 3.46 2.97 1 24 -55.60 0.00        
 
Mean number of trades until convergence for the case in which the market maker can receive 
either a correct or incorrect signal with probability δ . The mean number of trades were 
calculated across the 10,000 trials. Pooled t-tests across group means are performed to examine 
the difference in spreads against the base case of the GM model. The respective t-statistic and its 
relevant p-values are shown. The different panels in the tables give the results for the different 
proportions of informed trading in the market. 
 
Table 9 demonstrates the average time taken for convergence under certain combinations of 
parameters. The striking result, once again, is that convergence is quicker, on average, than 
in the case of the no-signal GM model; although for low and high values of μ , the 
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significance drops for marginal values of δ (especially when δ = 0.6). This suggests that 
the average signal does not aid the market maker in finding the true price and he must 
therefore rely more heavily on the sequence of trades. For a high value of μ , it could, once 
again, suggest that the quality of the signal becomes worthless unless confidence is 
significantly greater for fear of losing significantly to the informed traders. The last point to 
note is that convergence becomes increasingly quicker when α = 1.0 compared to 0.5 for 
increasing levels of δ  as shown in Table 10 below. 
 
Table 10 Model 1 t-statistics Comparing Mean Spreads for α = 0.5 vs. α = 1.0 
Comparison Variables μ = 0.3 μ = 0.5 μ = 0.7 
α =0.5 vs. α =1.0 t-ratio p-value t-ratio p-value t-ratio p-value 
δ = 0.5 -0.78 0.44 0.66 0.51 0.32 0.75 
δ = 0.6 -1.21 0.23 -5.84 0.00 -0.48 0.63 
δ = 0.7 -1.48 0.14 -7.40 0.00 -6.27 0.00 
δ = 0.8 -6.68 0.00 -15.20 0.00 -11.42 0.00 
δ = 0.9 -18.80 0.00 -17.60 0.00 -16.72 0.00 
 
Pooled t-tests across group means are performed to examine the difference in spreads for α = 0.5 
against α = 1.0. GM model. The respective t-statistic and its relevant p-values are shown against 
differing levels of μ . 
 
The overall conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of the Model 1 simulations are 
that, on average, the market exhibits lower spreads and faster price adjustment to true value 
when the market maker has the ability to receive a signal with any probability ≠ 0.5. This 
lends weight to the hypothesis that market makers are beneficial for the market when they 
are able to receive superior information. The results also uncovered that the trade-off 
between volatility and price efficiency is nonexistent for non-extreme values of δ . This 
means that increasing levels of efficiency do not noticeably increase the volatility of the 
market. The next section analyses the simulations for Model 2. 
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5.2 Model 2 Simulations 
 
As for Model 1, several simulations were performed on Model 2 with the operation of the 
economy as described in Section 4. That is, at any time during the day the market maker 
may receive a completely accurate signal with a probability of occurrence specified by the 
parameter α . There are three general simulations analysed by varying the probability of 
receiving a signal as 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, respectively. Each simulation is then repeated with 
the proportion of informed traders ranging in values of 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7. 10,000 trials for 
each particular parameter combination were run. The other parameters are fixed at varying 
values under certain conditions as shown in Table 11 below. 
 
Table 11 Model 2 Simulation Parameters 
 Simulations 
Parameters 1 2 3 
V =  V  V  V  
θ =  0.5 0.5 0.5 γ =  0.5 0.5 0.5 α =  0.3 0.5 0.7 μ =  {0.3, 0.5, 0.7} {0.3, 0.5, 0.7} {0.3, 0.5, 0.7} 
 
Model parameter values for a specific simulation. The true value is always set at V which is 100. The 
probability of an uninformed action, denoted by γ , is set at 0.5. The probability of receiving a correct 
signal is denoted as α . The proportion of informed trading is represented by the parameter μ .  
 
5.2.1 Simulations 1, 2 & 3 - Spread and Convergence Comparisons 
Analysis of Figure 18 shows striking results in that the price paths for Model 2 significantly 
achieve convergence faster than the GM model. Panels A, B and C illustrate cases with 
different proportions of informed traders in the market. It is unclear from analysis of the 
figures whether price adjustment becomes quicker for Model 2 as the proportion of 
informed traders increase, as opposed to Model 1 and the GM model.  
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Furthermore, at any point in time, the size of the spread appears to be significantly smaller 
than that of the GM model, lending support to Proposition 7 of Section 4. In addition, it is 
interesting to note that as α  increases, so does the mean accuracy of the placement of the 
initial spread. That is, on average, the spread is priced closer to the true value of the asset at 
the beginning of the trading interval. Although in the figures, the number of trades for 
convergence across the differing levels of μ  appear to be similar for a specific level of α ,  
Table 13 shows that these differences are significant with convergence still faster as the 
proportion of informed trading increases. 
 
It is interesting to observe that the average price paths in Model 2 exhibit large volatility in 
prices, reflecting automatic price adjustment. Table 12 outlines the volatility in midpoint 
returns for the price series and shows that the volatility is actually reduced under Model 2 
for increased values of μ  as compared to the GM model. This could be explained by the 
fact that under the GM model, there is an increased random element to the movements in 
prices.  
 
Moreover, the movements in prices after a trade in Model 2 for a price path that does not 
contain a signal are dampened, as this reflects the fact that the market maker is pricing into 
his quotes the expectation that a signal will be received after the next trade. This is because 
the expected value conditional upon receiving a signal is constant (as it is independent of 
trade direction) which will thus dampen the effect a trade action will have on a buy or sell 
at the market maker’s quoted price, as was stated in Section 3.3.2.  
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Table 12 Model 2 Volatility in Midpoint Returns 
μ = 0.3 μ = 0.5 μ = 0.7 
GM 42.51% 75.16% 103.05% 
α = 0.3 46.13% 60.83% 68.31% 
α = 0.5 46.53% 49.19% 57.80% 
α = 0.7 41.23% 38.73% 43.76% 
 
The standard deviation of midpoint returns was calculated across the 10,000 trials where the 
midpoint is calculated as Mt = Askt - Bidt. The standard deviations were calculated for all levels of α whilst varying the proportion of informed traders μ . The standard deviations for the GM model 
are also given. 
 
It is because of this dampening effect that the mean spreads, for a particular level of α , do 
not significantly differ across the varying levels of μ  as seen in Table 13. The only 
significant difference found is when α = 0.3 and comparison is between the means spreads 
for μ =0.3 versus 0.7, and also for μ =0.5 versus 0.7. This highlights the fact that for low 
levels of α , the dampening effect is not as significant and as a result, trader actions affect 
the prices to a greater degree. 
Figure 18 Model 2 - Average Bid and Ask Price Paths 
Panel A: Price Paths for α =0.3, 0.5, 0.7. μ = 0.3 
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Panel B: Price Paths for α =0.3, 0.5, 0.7. μ = 0.5 
 
 
Panel C: Price Paths for α =0.3, 0.5, 0.7. μ = 0.7 
 
 
Average bid and ask price paths when the proportion of informed traders in the market is μ =
0.3, 0.5 and 0.7 for panels A, B and C respectively. In each graph, the probability of receiving a 
signal is α = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7. All graphs are plotted against the base-case GM model. 
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Table 13 Model 2 Signal Comparisons  
Mean Spreads Mean Number of Trades 
Panel A: α =0.3 Panel A: α =0.3 
Parameter t-ratio p-value t-ratio p-value 
μ = 0.3 vs. μ = 0.5 -1.01 0.31 -36.64 0.00 
μ = 0.3 vs. μ = 0.7 7.38 0.00 -57.95 0.00 
μ = 0.5 vs. μ = 0.7 8.8 0.00 -24.33 0.00 
Panel A: α =0.5 Panel A: α =0.5 
μ = 0.3 vs. μ = 0.5 -1.75 0.08 -30.87 0.00 
μ = 0.3 vs. μ = 0.7 0.08 0.93 -43.25 0.00 
μ = 0.5 vs. μ = 0.7 1.86 0.06 -15.86 0.00 
Panel A: α =0.7 Panel A: α =0.7 
μ = 0.3 vs. μ = 0.5 -2.56 0.01 -22.81 0.00 
μ = 0.3 vs. μ = 0.7 -0.74 0.46 -31.34 0.00 
μ = 0.5 vs. μ = 0.7 1.79 0.07 -11.54 0.00 
 
Comparisons of mean spreads and mean number of trades until converge for differing combinations 
of μ . Pooled t-tests across group means are performed to examine the differences. The respective t-
statistic and its relevant p-values are shown. The different panels in the tables give the results for the 
different probabilities of receiving a signal α . 
 
Table 14 and Table 15 report the mean spreads and mean number of trades until 
convergence, respectively. The t-statistics comparing the group means of Model 2 with that 
of the GM model are also presented with the respective p-value. These tables show that as 
the probability of receiving a signal increases, the mean size of the spread significantly 
decreases. Similarly, as this probability increases, convergence is significantly enhanced 
with the mean number of trades until convergence dropping. 
 
Overall, the results in this section find that Model 2 provides a framework in which the 
market maker becomes fully informed about the true value and thus passes on the benefits 
to the market in terms of proportionately smaller spreads (even before he becomes 
informed) and significantly enhanced convergence to the true value.  
 
      127 
 
Table 14 Model 2 Mean Spreads Per Trial 
 
Panel A: μ = 0.3 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
α =0, GM 13.61 3.76 4.85 25.08 - - 
α =0.3 9.06 6.18 0.00 18.53 62.87 0.00 
α =0.5 4.30 4.42 0.00 12.66 160.66 0.00 
α =0.7 1.40 2.26 0.00 7.25 277.60 0.00 
Panel B: μ = 0.5 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
α =0, GM 20.61 5.08 8.09 35.49 - - 
α =0.3 13.10 9.12 0.00 28.00 71.85 0.00 
α =0.5 6.83 6.90 0.00 20.00 160.80 0.00 
α =0.7 2.36 3.68 0.00 10.80 289.71 0.00 
Panel C: μ = 0.7 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value
α =0, GM 29.13 4.85 17.00 47.99 - - 
α =0.3 16.79 11.60 0.00 36.83 98.23 0.00 
α =0.5 8.75 8.96 0.00 25.33 200.05 0.00 
α =0.7 3.05 4.91 0.00 14.04 376.90 0.00 
 
 Mean spread for the case in which the market maker can receive either 
a correct or incorrect signal with probability δ . The mean spreads were 
calculated across the 10,000 trials. Pooled t-tests across group means are 
performed to examine the difference in spreads against the base case of 
the GM model. The respective t-statistic and its relevant p-values are 
shown. The different panels in the tables give the results for the 
different proportions of informed trading in the market. 
 
 
 
Table 15 Model 2 Mean Number of Trades Per Trial 
 
Panel A: μ = 0.3 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value 
α =0, GM 31.64 24.74 9 179 - - 
α =0.3 2.26 2.72 0 22 118.05 0.00 
α =0.5 0.97 1.39 0 9 123.77 0.00 
α =0.7 0.40 0.74 0 5 126.16 0.00 
Panel B: μ = 0.5 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value 
α =0, GM 12.23 6.83 6 50 - - 
α =0.3 2.29 2.59 0 13 136.09 0.00 
α =0.5 1.00 1.42 0 8 160.98 0.00 
α =0.7 0.42 0.79 0 5 171.56 0.00 
Panel C: μ = 0.7 
Parameter Mean Std Min Max t-ratio p-value 
α =0, GM 5.60 2.46 4 24 - - 
α =0.3 2.02 1.91 0 10 114.80 0.00 
α =0.5 0.98 1.35 0 8 164.31 0.00 
α =0.7 0.41 0.79 0 7 200.06 0.00 
 
Mean number of trades until convergence for the case in which the 
market maker can receive either a correct or incorrect signal with 
probability δ . The mean number of trades were calculated across the 
10,000 trials. Pooled t-tests across group means are performed to 
examine the difference in spreads against the base case of the GM 
model. The respective t-statistic and its relevant p-values are shown. 
The different panels in the tables give the results for the different 
proportions of informed trading in the market. 
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5.3 Overall Summary 
 
Having studied the graphs and the associated significant tables, it is clear that the average 
spread at any time is smaller in Models 1 and 2 than that of the GM base case. Similarly, 
the convergence to the true value is enhanced significantly when there is a positive 
probability of receiving a correct signal. All of the results are highly statistically significant, 
giving support for the proofs put forward in Section 4, in which spreads are narrower at any 
point in time, and convergence to the true value is quicker, than that which occurs under the 
GM model.  
 
These simulation results therefore lend weight to the hypothesis that informed market 
makers are beneficial for the market in terms of reduced spreads and faster convergence 
speed. Moreover, contrary to the popular view that increased efficiency of a market, in 
terms of the speed of price adjustment, attracts increased volatility, the results presented 
here show that volatility is actually reduced under this model even though it retains 
superior efficiency to the GM model. The implications of this are highlighted in the next 
section. 
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6. Implications, Criticisms and ExtensionsEquation Chapter 6 Section 1
 
This section begins by describing the empirical implications of the reduced spread and 
increased speed of adjustment. In addition, these results are then further generalised to 
consider issues affecting market performance, such as stability in prices and implications 
for market design. Criticisms of the models are next discussed, along with possible 
extensions and areas for future research.  
 
6.1 Empirical Implications 
 
The implications of informed market makers developed to this point concern the width of 
the spread and the speed of adjustment to the true value. These issues may become 
important for market microstructure researchers investigating either of these areas across 
markets. Specifically, the researcher, when comparing two different markets, and, 
therefore, drawing conclusions from different spread sizes and price discovery, may need to 
consider not only if those markets contain informed market makers, but also the potential 
sources of their information. If the researcher fails to do so, he may mistakenly come to 
incorrect conclusions on efficiency and pricing dynamics by not recognising the need to 
control for the informativeness of a market maker. Consider for example Model 2, in which 
the market marker reduces his spread by an amount proportional to the probability of 
becoming informed. The market maker at this point in time is not yet informed, but he still 
posts a narrower spread than otherwise. Failure to account for this could result in 
misleading conclusions.  
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Another issue is the market maker’s quote setting process. The results found in this paper 
imply that examining order flow information will not be sufficient when analysing the 
market maker’s decision process. Future researchers should therefore take caution when 
analysing market making firms and will need to take into account any potential sources of 
information the firm may have access to. 
 
6.2 Implications for Market Performance and Market Design 
 
In this section, the previous analysis is considered in relation to issues regarding market 
performance, and the role of informed market makers in the design of markets. The 
discussion on what is ‘best’ for market performance is a long and ongoing one. The reason 
for this is that some features of a market that may facilitate the performance of some 
functions may impede the delivery of others, and, therefore, there is confusion about what 
features are preferred over others. As was discussed in Section 2 of this paper, since trading 
is a zero-sum game, some traders gain at the expense of others. Specifically, informed 
traders gain at the expense of uninformed traders; however, these gains provide the 
momentum for the incorporation of information into prices. What this implies, therefore, is 
that market efficiency is purchased at the expense of uninformed participants. Whether this 
is more or less beneficial to market welfare in general is still a question unanswered in the 
literature.  
 
However, as shown in the previous sections, the introduction of an informed market maker 
is able to reduce the losses of uninformed traders trading with informed traders because he 
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is able to post narrower spreads. Similarly, if he receives some additional piece of 
information regarding the true value of the stock, then prices become more efficient since, 
under these conditions, they converge faster to their full informational values. Hence, if 
efficiency is a desirable property in securities markets, then by introducing a market maker 
who is more informed, the performance of the market is improved. Furthermore, since he is 
able to facilitate price discovery in the market without imposing any additional costs upon 
the uninformed traders, then, from a regulator’s perspective, this would avoid the dilemma 
of deciding what is more beneficial to the market: narrower spreads or enhanced efficiency.  
 
However, the interesting aspect of this price behaviour is that normally there is a distinct 
trade-off between efficiency and volatility: faster price adjustment with increased volatility, 
slower price adjustment with decreased volatility. This reflects the fact that markets in 
which prices are adjusted more quickly to their more accurate values will always exhibit 
large price volatility, conditional on the same order flow. It is interesting to note that many 
regulatory proposals attempt to decrease volatility through some structural change in the 
market, or restrictions on particular types of trading strategies.44 Consider for example the 
recent ban in the U.S. market in September 2008 on short selling which was put in place so 
as to mitigate the extraordinary market volatility.45 Therefore, it would be of interest for 
regulatory policy makers to consider the results found in the previous section on volatility, 
which showed that the trade-off with efficient prices was not observed. That is, increased 
                                                 
44 Although it is important to distinguish between the two different types of volatility: transitory and 
fundamental. Regulators should aim to reduce transitory volatility and should perhaps consider the 
introduction of informed market makers as a method of achieving this. Since the informed market makers will 
know the fundamental value of the security, they will be able to mitigate transitory movements away from 
this value caused by noise trading or even due to market manipulation practices. 
45 See the SEC’s website for a detailed description on the nature of this ban: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm  
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efficiency found in both models did not have a significantly positive impact on volatility as 
compared to a market operating in accordance with the GM model.  
 
Finally, O’Hara (1995) has stated that the general effects of market efficiency benefit 
society directly by reducing the cost of capital for firms. This was also stated by Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991), who found that reductions of the information asymmetries faced by 
uninformed traders can actually reduce a firm’s cost of capital through increased demand 
from large investors, due to increased liquidity of its securities. In a paper by Easley et al. 
(2002), they also found that asset prices increase with reduction of information 
asymmetries, which was also confirmed by a later paper from Easley and O’Hara (2004), 
which showed that investors demand a higher return for holding stocks with more 
asymmetric information between traders. Although informed market makers are not a 
panacea for this, the introduction of informed market makers could potentially reduce these 
informational asymmetries and hence, in turn, reduce a firm’s cost of capital, which would 
therefore improve market efficiency for society in general.  
 
This may provide justification for a firm to develop a close professional relationship with 
the market maker and therefore to negotiate a contract with him, as seen on the Borsa 
Italiana, so that the firm can then effectively manage, through the market maker’s setting of 
spreads and price discovery, its own cost of capital. This analysis supports the results found 
by Anand et al. (2007), on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE). They argued that firms 
should enter into contracts with liquidity providers as they found several benefits to the 
firm as a result. Liquidity in that stock was improved and the firm was therefore able to 
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absorb liquidity shocks better. This resulted in lower return volatility, consistent with the 
analysis of Model 2 in this paper. Other benefits included positive returns around the date 
on which the firm entered into the contract with the market maker, and also decreased costs 
of capital. 
 
6.2.1 Implications for the Design of a Market 
Over the past decade, there has been a proliferation of new markets, such as the 
introduction of electronic communication and crossing networks and increased growth of 
markets across Asia and Europe. In this environment, the survival of any market depends 
on its being economically competitive. The survival of any market, however, is difficult to 
understand, since any market may adopt particular features to suit a specific set of market 
participants. For example, if the market is to suit the clearing house, then the aim of its 
design may be to maximise trading commissions. However, if the market is to suit 
uninformed participants, then the goal may be to reduce all implicit and explicit trading 
costs. Furthermore, from the point of view of a regulator, the market’s desired features 
would be those that provide solid stability and resiliency in prices. Thus, the question is: 
what design is best for the market in general? 
 
In a paper on market welfare, Domowitz (1990) defined a market as being beneficial for the 
public in general if it satisfied several criteria. The most notable of these, however, were 
reliable price discovery and minimisation of trading costs. Using this definition to evaluate 
best market design, it can be noted that considering the inclusion of informed market 
makers into the design of a market is clearly necessary. This will not only enhance price 
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discovery, but will also reduce trading costs for all traders in the form of a narrower spread. 
Furthermore, extra confidence will be instilled into uninformed traders if that market is 
highly populated by informed traders. As noted in Section 3 and 4, this may provide 
justification to give the market maker unique access to order flow. 
 
Hence, these points become especially relevant for the Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX), which is considering the introduction of market makers into small-cap stocks in the 
equities market.46 The ASX may wish to consider the sanction that listed firms should 
designate informed market makers and subsequently negotiate a contract with them to 
provide and enhance liquidity. Furthermore, the ASX may wish to impose requirements on 
the market makers to provide analyst reports in these small-cap stocks, as is the case on the 
Borsa Italiana. As discussed previously, this would then enhance the confidence of 
uninformed traders in these stocks. 
 
6.2.2 The Market Maker’s Perspective 
One of the assumptions in this paper has been that the market maker does not take his 
inventory into consideration, whereas in reality the inventory risk a market maker faces is 
quite significant. As a result, market makers are generally reluctant to trade large positions, 
which is why certain markets allow for the delayed reporting of trades by market makers so 
that they are able to unwind their positions at minimal cost. This can lead to stale prices and 
erosion of price discovery. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that an informed 
market maker will not be as exposed to this inventory risk and hence will be able to trade 
                                                 
46 See the ASX’s website regarding the currently proposed market structural reforms: 
http://www.asx.com.au/about/media/market_structural_reforms.htm  
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larger positions without the need for delayed reporting as he is now confident of the asset’s 
true value, which would mean he is now not exposed to adverse selection risk.47 
Consequently, price discovery will not be hindered, and since the market maker is more 
willing to trade larger parcels, liquidity may be enhanced similarly. 
 
6.3 Criticisms and Limitations 
 
One potential criticism of the arguments presented in this paper concerns the justification of 
an informed market maker. The success of the models used relies on the market maker’s 
ability to extract information from the receipt of a signal. It was stated previously that he 
could achieve this by being part of an analyst firm or by stipulating contracts with the firm 
for which he is making a market. However, given all the aforementioned benefits, one 
might ask why all market making firms do not try to attain these types of information. One 
possible reason may be that the cost of becoming informed, which has been excluded from 
this analysis, is so large as to outweigh the benefits. Another possibility is that market 
making firms are already partially informed, which would imply that the models presented 
in this paper provide a more realistic look at market making. 
 
One other issue is the possible agency behaviour of the firm who has the contract with the 
market maker. It was assumed that the firm would allow the market maker access to 
examine extensively the firm’s fundamentals. However, it is possible that the firm may 
                                                 
47 However it should be noted that the market maker may still be exposed to risk in movements of the true 
value on a day to day basis. The analysis performed in this paper assumes that the market maker discovers the 
true value of the security on a particular trading day. The next day may entail finding it again. Hence, the 
market makers may need to consider the closing out of all positions before the day’s end. 
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only provide the market maker access on release of good news. This would limit the 
discovery of bad news about that firm, which may appear to be in the firm’s interests, but 
could harm the market maker’s inventory positions in that stock and consequently the 
benefit he provides to the market for the firm’s stock. Analysis of this would make an 
interesting area for further research on a market such as the Borsa Italiana or the SSE. 
 
Agency costs could also be associated with an informed market maker. As noted in Section 
2, some studies have found that the market maker became detrimental to the market by 
posting inaccurate and wide spreads. In the present study, the market maker has been 
assumed to act in a manner that is risk-neutral and competitive, and to be trading with 
informed traders who should limit this strategic behaviour. Similarly, market regulations 
specifying negative obligations would further discourage such adverse behaviour. The next 
section addresses these issues with potential extensions to the model and areas for further 
research. 
 
6.4 Extensions and Areas for Further Research 
 
6.4.1 Adding the Cost of Acquiring Information 
If the market maker is a member of an analyst brokerage house that provides informative 
analysis to the market maker on a daily basis, then the cost of gathering that information 
may be significant in terms of operational costs. As a result, the marker maker will include 
this cost into his bid and ask price, since he is risk-neutral and competitive. This implies 
that his ask and bid prices subsequently increase and decrease respectively. If IC  is 
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denoted as the cost of acquiring information, then the spread in Model 1 at any time 
1t k= + will become: 
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The equilibrium spread is, therefore, defined when 11 1Spread Spread
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− −= . The particular 
cost for finding this equilibrium is, therefore, the solution of: 
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Similarly, in Model 2 his spread will become: 
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In this particular case where 
1k
S S
i Aθ θ Ω−∉  therefore, the spread will become: 
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 ( )21 1Spread 1 Spread 2IM C GM Ik k Cα+− −= − +  (6.4) 
 
Thus, the equilibrium spread would be equal to the GM spread when the cost is: 
 
 *1Spread2
GM I
k C
α
− =  (6.5) 
 
It is clear in both models that if *I IC C<  then the market is going to benefit overall since 
there will be decreased spreads and also increased efficiency. As *I IC C→ , the benefits 
that diminish will only be those pertaining to the spreads, and will reduce to the point at 
which the spread is at least as large as that under the GM model; efficiency is not affected 
from these costs.48 This raises an interesting question when *I IC C> : at what value of IC  
will the spread be so large that efficiency, in terms of quicker price adjustment, is no longer 
preferable? The answer to this question would be of interest to policy makers and may 
provide explanations for results found by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Black (1986) 
and Leach and Madhavan (1993). These authors found that that there is a distinct trade-off 
between spreads and price path convergence.  
 
The authors’ reasoning, however, is different to that presented in this section. Specifically, 
they stated that since larger spreads decrease uninformed traders’ willingness to trade, this 
causes the remaining order flow to be more informative, and convergence to occur more 
quickly. 
                                                 
48 Furthermore, in Appendix A.12 a proof is presented that shows that the utility of risk-averse uninformed 
traders will be greater when they trade with an informed market maker compared to when they trade with an 
uninformed market maker, with both posting the same sized spread. 
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6.4.2 Multi-Market Maker Model 
The analysis performed in this paper assumes that the market maker acted competitively, 
but it does not explore the possible effects that an informed market maker would have on 
other market makers. This would be of interest to researchers into multi-market maker 
markets such as Nasdaq and various option markets. Calcagno and Lovo (2006) addressed 
this issue, although their model did not include the role of informed traders, which may 
provide an interesting extension to both this study and theirs.   
 
6.4.3 Strategic Trader Models 
An approach such as that of Kyle (1985) to developing a model may be interesting to adopt 
for both Model 1 and Model 2. The model would ideally examine the strategic nature of the 
informed trader if he knew the market maker to be partially informed. What may result is 
that the informed traders may try to fool the market maker (in the case of Model 1), or even 
perhaps increase their frequency of trading (in the case of Model 2), since they would then 
know there may be a limited amount of time to exploit their informational arbitrage. 
 
6.4.4 Empirical Testing 
The analysis presented in this paper has the potential for numerous empirical studies, some 
of which have already been noted. It would first be interesting to provide empirical results 
using the models, and to see if these confirmed the results of the simulations. This could be 
achieved on the FX market, the Borsa Italiana and Nasdaq (as found by Peiers, 1997; 
Nimalendran and Petralla, 2003; and Heidle and Li, 2005; respectively). Alternatively, 
there may be some benefit in conducting a clean laboratory experiment. However, there are 
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two distinct empirical issues which the author of this paper believes would be the most 
interesting.  
 
Firstly, it would make an interesting event study on the Borsa Italiana to analyse the price 
setting behaviour of the market makers around the release of their mandated analyst reports. 
The market makers are not required to provide continuous disclosure of their information, 
but are only required to publish reports on the firm twice a year. As a result, the market 
makers would become increasingly informed up to the release of the analyst report, at 
which point, they would lose their informational advantage. It is then postulated that the 
market maker may post decreased spreads before the release of the report and increased 
spreads after, which could be an interesting analysis, considering previous research has 
found the opposite; i.e. that spreads are larger before the release of public information 
(Koski and Michaely, 2000; Calcagno and Lovo, 2006) 
 
The second issue concerns the effects of an informed market maker on a cross-section of 
stocks. The reason this would be interesting to study is that smaller-cap stocks are assumed 
to have higher informational asymmetries (as found in Nimalendran and Petrella, 2003; and 
Li and Parker, 2005). It may be found that the introduction of an informed market maker 
provides more benefits for smaller-cap stocks than for larger-cap stocks. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The concept that a market maker may be partially informed is a research area that is 
attracting increased attention, with the advent of recent empirical studies reporting evidence 
of asymmetrically informed market makers. This growing popularity can be attributed to 
the fact that it was previously assumed that all market makers were uninformed. Studies 
such as those conducted by Peiers (1997), Huang (2002) and Heidle and Li (2005) found 
compelling evidence that market makers were able to disseminate private information 
through their quotes before respective public announcements.  
 
It is as a result of these studies, and the lack of theoretical grounding in this area, that the 
development of a model that analyses the dynamics of prices set by informed markets 
makers was stimulated. The sequential trade model is a suitable choice of model, as it 
allows for the inspection of bid and ask quotes at a particular point in time, whilst strategic 
trade models, on the other hand, do not. Analysis on bid and ask quotes is necessary to 
determine how the adverse selection component of the spread changes with the receipt of 
signals and varying levels of informed trading.  
 
Specifically, two models were developed in this paper in order to provide two frameworks 
in which a market maker could become informed, each exploring how the market makers of 
varying types manage the informational asymmetry problem. The first model is based on 
the possibility that a market maker, part of an analyst brokerage house, becomes informed 
through his own thorough research. This model describes how the market maker may 
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receive an informative signal at the beginning of the day, and consequently analyses the 
dynamics of beliefs and price adjustment under the receipt of correct or incorrect signals 
with specific levels of accuracy. It was discovered that even though the detriment to the 
market under the receipt of an incorrect signal was greater than the benefit to the market 
under a correct signal, the overall effects were beneficial to the market, providing narrower 
spreads and faster adjustment to full information levels, on average. In addition, the 
volatility in this model was found not to be a proportional trade-off to the speed of price 
adjustment as commonly believed in previous literature, except at extreme levels of signal 
quality. 
 
The second model is based on a market in which the market maker has thorough and 
detailed access to the public information about the fundamentals of the firm for which he is 
required to make a market. An example of this model can be seen in the Borsa Italiana 
market, in which market makers are obligated to provide liquidity in small-cap stocks. The 
model describes how the market maker has a possibility of receiving a fully informative 
signal at some point during the course of the trading day. It is because of this that the 
market maker is able to quote narrower spreads, as he knows that losses will be limited at 
the point in which he does receive a signal from the firm. As the probability of receiving a 
signal rises, so does the speed at which the price adjustment process occurs. Similar to the 
previous model, this model supported the fact that as the speed of adjustment process was 
increased, through the increasing probability of receiving a signal, the volatility of returns 
in the market was not proportionately increased either. In fact, the results found that as this 
probability increased, then the overall volatility actually decreased. 
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The results found from the two models support the hypothesis that informed market makers 
are beneficial for improving efficiency in the market, where efficiency is defined in terms 
of size of spreads, speed of price adjustment and also price returns volatility. Both models 
also support the idea that the market maker is able to subject himself to an increased 
proportion of informed trading in the market as he becomes more informed. Therefore, with 
studies such as Easley et al. (1998) reporting that informed traders prefer trading in 
derivative markets such as option markets, the presence of informed market makers in these 
specific markets may be beneficial for the uninformed traders of these markets as they 
would be able to reduce adverse selection risk and the cost of trade and increase the 
confidence of uninformed traders to trade in these markets. This would therefore increase 
the participation of uninformed traders in the market and thus enhance liquidity.  
 
The criticisms of these models are that these models ignore the possibility of agency 
problems and costs of becoming informed. Agency problems may be relevant as market 
makers in reality are profit motivated agents who, instead of acting in the best interests of 
uninformed traders, may exploit their informational advantage at the expense of 
uninformed traders as found by Manaster and Mann (1999). It was proposed in Section 3 
that these agency problems would be lessened with negative obligations set by regulators, 
competition, and also informed traders (since the market maker would not be able to firstly 
post inaccurate spreads, and then secondly post wide quotes, as then informed traders 
would become the providers of liquidity, as concluded by Bloomfield et al., 2004). 
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The implications of these results are important for researchers, regulators and market 
makers alike. Market microstructure researchers may be interested in using these models as 
a base for their empirical research, which could include the comparison of markets that 
have informed market makers versus those with uninformed market makers. Such research 
would show whether the results found in this paper hold up in practice.  
 
Regulators would be interested in these results since it is their responsibility to create and 
enforce rules that facilitate trading and provide a market platform that is beneficial for all 
market participants. The adoption of an informed market maker into either a market that 
has no designated liquidity provider, or that has an uninformed market maker, (alongside 
certain negative obligations enforced upon the market maker to avoid possible agency 
problems) would therefore support the benefits that regulatory policy makers seek to 
achieve.  
 
Finally, the market makers would be able to use these results to investigate the option of 
becoming informed for two main reasons. Firstly, since market making requires significant 
amounts of capital, advanced risk-management systems need to be put in place to limit the 
market maker from generating significant losses. The reduction of risk by becoming 
informed may reduce the requirement for development of these complex risk-management 
systems and, thus, reduce these costs. Secondly, market makers may be in a better position 
to be designated the role of an official market maker by the exchange if they are informed, 
because of the additional benefits they would then provide. This point is of significant 
relevance in current markets since the number of market making firms is decreasing 
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substantially, and to remain competitive, the market making firms may wish to explore the 
preference of becoming informed. 
 
In conclusion, this paper is the first to model formally the dynamics of bid and ask prices 
set by an informed market maker using a sequential based modelling approach. Although 
there were a number of assumptions made, generalised conclusions can be drawn from the 
results showing that market makers who are informed promote market efficiency. Since this 
area is attracting growing attention, there is no doubt that this issue will become more 
relevant in the future. 
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AppendixEquation Chapter (Next) Section 1
 
Appendix A.1 Introduction to Two-Variable Bayes’ Theorem 
 
Bayes’ theorem, in probability theory relates conditional probabilities of two random 
events. This is then used to calculate a posterior probability given observed data. It states 
that the posterior belief at any time t is equal to the probability of an event occurring 
conditional upon observed data. Mathematically this is represented as: 
   
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
Pr
Pr
Pr( )
Pr Pr
Pr( )
where Pr  Marginal likelihood of the data
Pr Pr Pr Pr
t t
t
t
t
t
t t
Posterior Belief event data
Prior Belief data event
data
event data event
data
data
event data event not event data not event
=
=
=
=
= +
 (A.1) 
 
Also it is easy to show that ( ) ( )Pr 1 Prt tnot event data event data= − . 
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Example: Glosten and Milgrom (1985) Model 
 
In the case of the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model the event is defined as the random 
draw of the asset’s value, either V or V . The data consists of the market maker’s 
information set which consists only upon trade data. Consider the first posterior belief in 
which the market maker has observed a buy as the recent trade action. The posterior at time 
1t =  is therefore: 
  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
Pr Buy Pr Pr Buy
Pr Buy
Pr Buy Pr Buy
Pr Pr Buy
Pr Pr Buy Pr Pr Buy
Prior Belief V V V
Posterior Belief V
V V
V V V V
×= = =
= +
 (A.2) 
 
To see how the market maker updates his next posterior, then consider that at time 2t =  the 
market maker observes another buy. The revised posterior then becomes: 
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( )
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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2 1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
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Pr Buy Pr Buy
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Pr Pr Buy Pr Buy Pr Pr Buy Pr Buy
Posterior Belief V
Posterior Belief V
Posterior Belief V Posterior Belief V
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V V V V V V
=
= × + ×
= +
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 2
Pr Pr Buy
Pr Pr Buy Pr Pr Buy
V V
V V V V
= +
 (A.3) 
 
This is because the probabilities of a trader action at any time t are independently and 
identically distributed (i.i.d) which means that ( ) ( ) ( )1 2Pr Buy Pr Buy Pr BuyV V V= = . 
 
The market maker, in this way, is able to revise his belief upon any sequence of trade 
actions. Therefore his posterior belief at any time t, whereby the market maker has 
observed b buys and s sells where t b s= +  is therefore: 
 
 
( )
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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Pr  Buys,  Sells
Pr Pr  Buys,  Sells
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t
b s
b s b s
Posterior Belief V b s
V b s V
V b s V V b s V
V V V
V V V V V V
=
= +
= +
 (A.4) 
 
The market maker’s quotes are therefore dependent upon the revision of his posterior 
beliefs. His ask price as the expected value of the asset conditional upon the next trade 
being a buy. Therefore following (A.4), the market maker’s ask price at any time t is 
therefore defined as: 
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 (A.5) 
 
The market maker’s bid price as defined as the expected value of the asset conditional upon 
the next trade being a sell. Using (A.4) similarly, his bid is therefore: 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
 Buys,  Sells, Sell
Pr Pr Buy Pr Sell Pr Pr Buy Pr Sell
Bid
Pr  Buys,  Sells, Sell Pr  Buys,  Sells, Sell
Pr Pr Buy Pr Sell Pr Pr Buy Pr Sell
t
b s b s
t
t t
b s b s
V b s
V V V V V V V
E
V V b s V V b s
V
V V V V V V
+
+ +
+ +
+ +
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
+
=
= +
=
+
 (A.6) 
 
Appendix A.2 Three-Variable Bayes’ Theorem 
 
The three variable Bayes’ theorem is an extension to the two-variable case in which the 
Bayesian uses another variable in his analysis to create his posterior beliefs. Using Model 1 
as an example, then the market makers initial posterior belief about event V occurring, 
conditional upon a certain trade at 1t = , 1A , and a certain initial signal, 0SΩ , is defined as: 
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 (A.7) 
 
Once again, it is easy to show that ( ) ( )0 1 0 1Pr 1 PrcV S A V S AΩ Ω= −∩ ∩ . 
 
Appendix A.3 Proof that the No Signal Case in Model 1 reduces to the GM Model 
 
The market maker’s initial prior belief given no signal can be shown to reduce down to the 
market maker’s prior belief in the GM model: 
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 (A.8) 
 
The posterior belief at time t, given b buys and s sells is therefore: 
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 (A.9) 
 
Appendix A.4 Model 1 Expressions and Derivations 
 
Initial Posteriors of the No Signal Case 
Probability of a high value of V occurring given a buy: 
 
 ( )0Buy, 1CS θ γ μ γμθ γ γμ θμ
+ −= − +  (A.10) 
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Probability of a high value of V occurring given a sell: 
 
 ( )( )( )0Sell, 1
1 1
1 1
CS θ γ μθ γ μ θμ
− −= − − −  (A.11) 
 
Derivatives of the No Signal Case with respect toμ  
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0 for , , 0, 1
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The market maker’s initial Bid price given a no signal: 
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The market maker’s initial Ask price given a no signal: 
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The market maker’s initial Spread: 
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Initial Posteriors of the Signal Case 
 
Let { }0 0,S S Sβ = :  
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Probability of a high value of V occurring, given an action and a certain signal:
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Derivatives of the market maker’s initial posteriors given a certain signal with respect to μ  
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Derivatives of the market maker’s initial posteriors given a High signal with respect to δ  
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Derivatives of the market maker’s initial posteriors given a Low signal with respect to δ  
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The market maker’s initial Bid for any possible signal: 
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The market maker’s initial Ask for any possible signal: 
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Therefore, the market maker’s bid and ask price for a high signal is defined as: 
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Hence, the Bid and Ask for a Low signal is defined as: 
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Dynamics of Model 1 
The market maker’s posterior probability is defined as: 
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 (A.32) 
 
Therefore, using (A.32), the market maker’s bid price at any time 1t k= +  will be: 
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 (A.33) 
His ask price can therefore be written as: 
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The spread at time 1t k= +  will therefore be defined as: 
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Appendix A.5 Strong Law of Large Numbers 
 
The Strong Law of Large Numbers states that if you take the average of a random variable 
that follows an i.i.d. process, then as the sample gets larger the average observation 
approaches the true mean. That is, if tP  is an i.i.d. process with mean μ , then  
 
1
1lim
T
tT t
P
t
μ→∞ = =∑  
 
In probabilistic terms, this means that on a set of sample path of this process, then in the 
limit the probability of this occurring is one almost surely (denoted a.s.): 
 
1
1Pr lim . 1
T
tT t
P a s
t
μ→∞ =
⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ JJJG  
 
Bayesian Updating 
Since the market maker is a Bayesian updater, his beliefs and thus prices will evolve over 
the course of the trading day. The movements in prices correspond to his learning about the 
true population distribution given the underlying information that he has observed. From 
this, several questions arise. Firstly, does the price process converge to a specific value in 
the limit? Secondly, if prices do converge, then what do they converge to? And finally 
regarding the speed of speed of convergence; how quickly do prices converge to that value?  
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There are two properties of Bayesian learning that is the key in answering these questions 
regarding the dynamics of the market maker’s pricing: 
 
1. The posterior beliefs converge almost surely to the true value; and 
2. A Bayesian’s posterior who has observed an independent and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.) process over time converges exponentially. 
 
Appendix A.6 Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Following O’Hara (1995), firstly let b = the number of buys, and s = the number of sells the 
market maker observes over the course of the trading day. It next needs to be noted that 
since trades are i.i.d., at any one given point in time, the market maker’s quotes are 
independent of the sequence of trades but rather dependent upon the cumulative total 
number of buys and sells. Next analyse the probabilities that the market maker attaches 
when encountering a given action (buy or sell), conditional upon the a signal outcome 
(either no signal, signal high or signal low): 
 
 
( )
( )
0
,
0
Pr Buy    
lim .
Pr Buy    b s
p V S if V Vb a s
b s q V S if V V
Ω
Ω→∞
⎧ = =⎪⎨+ = =⎪⎩
∩
JJJG ∩
 (A.36) 
  
 
( )
( )
0
,
0
1 Pr Sell    
lim .
1 Pr Sell    b s
p V S if V Vs a s
b s q V S if V V
Ω
Ω→∞
⎧ − = =⎪⎨+ − = =⎪⎩
∩
JJJG ∩
 (A.37) 
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The posterior probability the market maker attaches to a high value occurring, given he has 
observed b buys and s sells, conditional upon receiving a signal is thus: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
, 0
Pr Pr Buy Pr Sell
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b
S
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S V V S V S S V V S V S
V S b sθ Ω
Ω Ω Ω
Ω Ω Ω Ω Ω Ω
Ω
+
=
= ∩ ∩ ∩
∩ ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩
∩
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
0 0
Pr 1
Pr 1 Pr 1
b
b b
s
s s
S V p p
S V p p S V q q
Ω
Ω Ω
−= − + −
∩
∩ ∩
 (A.38) 
 
And similarly, the probability he attaches to a low value given b buys and s sells 
conditional upon a signal outcome is, 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
, 0
0
0
0 0
1 Pr ,
1 Pr ,
Pr 1
Pr 1 Pr 1
S
b s
b
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s
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V S b s
V S b s
S V q q
S V p p S V q q
θ Ω Ω
Ω
Ω
Ω Ω
− =
= −
−= − + −
∩
∩
∩
∩ ∩
 (A.39) 
 
Now suppose the event V V=  has just occurred. Then take the posteriors odds ratio (the 
probability that V V=  compared to the probability that ) :V V=  
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Pr , Pr 1
b
b
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s
V S b s S V q q
V S b s S V p p
Ω Ω
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 (A.40) 
 
Take logs,49  
 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
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0 0
0
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Pr , Pr 1
ln ln
Pr , Pr 1
Pr 1ln ln ln
1Pr
b
b
s
s
V S b s S V q q
V S b s S V p p
S V q qb s
p pS V
Ω Ω
Ω Ω
Ω
Ω
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟= + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∩ ∩
∩ ∩
∩
∩
 (A.41) 
 
The next step is to divide both sides by b s+ , which reflects the total number of trades 
during that day. And the take the limit as b s+ → ∞ : 
 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )0 0, , 00
, ,
Pr , Pr1 1lim ln lim ln
PrPr ,
1lim ln lim ln
1
b s b s
b s b s
V S b s S V
b s b s S VV S b s
b q s q
b s p b s p
Ω Ω
ΩΩ→∞ →∞
→∞ →∞
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟+ +⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−+ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ + −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
∩ ∩
∩∩
 (A.42) 
 
Since the event V V=  has occurred, then from (A.36) and (A.37)  it can be seen that, 
 
 
,
1lim . 0
b s
a s
b s→∞ + JJJG  (A.43) 
 
                                                 
49 Here the log as the natural logarithmic function, however the logarithmic function to any base can be used.  
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,
lim .
b s
b a s p
b s→∞ + JJJG  (A.44) 
 
 
,
lim . 1
b s
s a s p
b s→∞
−+ JJJG  (A.45) 
 
Therefore (A.42) converges almost surely to: 
 
 
( )
( ) ( )0, 0
Pr ,1 1lim ln . ln 1 ln
1Pr ,b s
V S b s q qa s p p
b s p pV S b s
Ω
Ω→∞
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟ + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ −⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∩
JJJG∩
 (A.46) 
 
The RHS of equation (A.46) now actually reflects the negative Kullback-Leibler (KL) 
Divergence, or relative entropy that is used to measure the difference between two 
probability distributions p and q. In the Bayesian framework, the KL divergence reflects a 
measure of the information gain in moving from the prior distribution to the posterior given 
new information has been discovered (here the information is the b buys and s sells. Thus 
equation (A.46) can be rewritten as,  
 
 
( )
( ) ( )0, 0
Pr ,1lim ln . ||
Pr , KLb s
V S b s
a s D p q
b s V S b s
Ω
Ω→∞
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ −+ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∩
JJJG∩
 (A.47) 
 
Now there are three properties of the KL divergence relative entropy that must be paid 
attention to: 
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1. ( )|| 0 ,KLD p q q p≥ ∀  (A.48) 
2. ( )|| 0KLD q q =  (A.49) 
3. ( )|| 0KLD p q if q p≠ ≠  (A.50) 
 
The implication of (A.50) states that, as long as q p≠ , then the RHS of equation (A.47) 
will always be negative.50 This will only happen if 
( )
( )0, 0
Pr ,
lim ln
Pr ,b s
V S b s
V S b s
Ω
Ω→∞
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ → −∞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∩
∩
, 
which suggests that either 
( )
( )0, 0
Pr ,
lim 0
Pr ,b s
V S b s
V S b s
Ω
Ω→∞
→∩
∩
 or ( )0,lim Pr , 0b s V S b sΩ→∞ →∩ . This 
then suggests that the market maker, as the total number of buys and sells approaches 
infinity, will revise his belief towards the true value that V V=  and conversely away from 
the belief that V V= , which concludes Proposition 2.  
 
Appendix A.7 Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Let t b s= + , that is let the total number of buys and sells be represented a specific time 
(since in the sequential trade model each time t represents one action occurring). Therefore 
(1.33) can be rewritten as, 
  
 
( )
( ) ( )00
Pr ,1lim ln . ||
Pr , KLt
V S b s
a s D p q
t V S b s
Ω
Ω→∞
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∩
JJJG∩
 (A.51) 
 
                                                 
50 Note that if p q= , then this implies that the beliefs return to their prior values and that the trade data is 
uninformative. This will only happen when the number of buys, b, is equal to the number of sells, s. 
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and hence,  
 
 
( )
( ) ( )0 . ||0
Pr ,
lim . 0 at rate
Pr ,
KLt D p q
t
V S b s
a s e
V S b s
Ω
−
Ω→∞
=∩ JJJG∩  (A.52) 
 
Model 2 
Initial Bid price given a no signal: 
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Initial Ask price given no signal: 
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The market maker’s initial spread: 
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Dynamics of Beliefs and Prices 
The market maker’s posterior probability at any time t k=  is defined as: 
 
( ) ( )1 1 2Pr Prk kS S c SA A k k iV S A Vθ θ θΩ Ω−= +∩ ∩ I I  
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This therefore means that if the market maker has not received any signal at time t k=  then 
his posterior probability will become: 
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( ) ( )00 0
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Pr Pr
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πθ π π
θ
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∩
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 (A.57) 
 
That is, the posterior probability reduces down to the GM posterior probability if he does 
not receive a signal at this point in time. 
 
Now, the market maker’s bid and ask price at any point in time is defined as follows: 
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Therefore the spread is then defined as: 
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Section 4 – Comparisons to the GM Model 
Appendix A.8 Derivative of the Initial Difference of the spread with respect to δ : 
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 (A.62) 
 
Appendix A.9 Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Let Hθ denote the market maker’s benchmark for a posterior such that he is confirmed that 
the true asset’s value is V . Hence  1 Hθ−  is the benchmark for a posterior that he is 
confirmed that the true asset’s value V≠ . Thus, for the market maker to not receive a 
signal, the KL Divergence theorem states that the distance from this posterior to his original 
prior of ( )Pr V θ=  is: 
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 (A.63) 
 
Where ( )KLD GM  is the KL Divergence under the GM model. 
 
Now if the market maker receives an initial signal ( S  say), then his prior will now be 
( ) ( )( )Pr 1 1V S θδθδ θ δ= + − − , thus the KL Divergence will become: 
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 (A.64) 
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Thus, to see if the divergence is smaller under the receipt of a signal, then it should be 
found that: 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0KL KLD GM D S− >  (A.65) 
 
Hence,  
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Similarly, 
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 (A.67) 
 
Appendix A.10 Proof of Corollary 1. 
 
Analysing Figure 8 of Proposition 5, it appears that for a given δ , the values of the 
difference above the x-axis are lower than the respective differences below the x-axis. 
Therefore, to test whether or not the positive difference (above the x-axis) is greater or 
smaller than the negative difference (below the x-axis), then the analysis on the addition of 
the differences between the GM case and the particular signal needs to be performed. In 
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this way, if the additions are either always positive, or always negative, it will therefore 
prove the corollary. 
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Therefore, using (A.66) and (A.67), equation (A.68) can be written as: 
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 (A.69) 
 
It is easily seen that the denominator in the log of (A.69) is greater than 1. This means that 
the log will be less than zero. This holds for all values of 0.5δ ≠  and θ . The implication 
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of this is that the detriment to the market, in terms of slower convergence, when the market 
maker receives an incorrect signal is significantly greater for a particular level of δ , than 
the benefits of faster convergence when the market maker receives a correct signal with that 
same level of δ . 
 
Appendix A.11 Proof of Proposition 3 
 
To prove proposition 3, take the difference of KL Divergences when the market maker does 
not receive a signal (which is analogous to the GM KL Divergence) to the case in which he 
receives the expected signal: 
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Now from (A.66) if 0.5δ > , then 0GM SKLD − > , also if 0.5δ < , then 0GM SKLD − < . However, 
note that in (A.70), if 0.5δ >  then ( )2 1 0δ − >  and also if 0.5δ <  then ( )2 1 0δ − < .  
Therefore, 
 
 [ ] ( )2 1 0
0.5
GM E S GM S
KL KLD D
θδ δ
− − ∀⎡ ⎤= − >⎣ ⎦ ∀ ≠  (A.71) 
 
This implies that the convergence under an expected signal is always faster than the 
convergence under the GM model (or in the case whereby the market maker does not 
receive any signal at all). 
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Appendix A.12 Proof that uninformed traders gain more utility when trading with an 
informed market maker who posts a spread equal to an uninformed 
market maker51 
 
Assume that in Market 1 and in Market 2 the uninformed and the informed market maker 
both set equal spreads. This may happen if an informed market maker has little or no 
competition, and hence does not reduce their spread despite no longer facing adverse 
selection risk. This could also be the result of the cost of becoming informed. 
 
Now assume that traders are risk-averse with a utility function ( ) ( )logU x x= , and that 
they begin with some level of initial wealth, P. Hence the utility of receiving y is 
( )log P y+ , rather than ( )U y .52 The utility curve need not be logarithmic; in fact any 
concave (risk-averse) utility function should produce the same conclusion. Note that the 
informed market maker sets the fundamental value V as the mid-point of the spread M, so 
that 12A V V B S− = − = . Thus,  
 
( )     U Trading with an informed market maker =  
( ) ( )
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1 1
2 2
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2 4
log log
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log
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P P S S
+ − + + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦
 
 
                                                 
51 Proof reproduced from the unpublished theory of Cameron (2006) with author’s permission. 
52 This mitigates the problem of having a utility of ( )log x  where 0x < , which has no real solution. 
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With an uninformed market maker, the algebra is quite similar to that of with an informed 
market maker, with the exception that 12A V V B S− ≠ − ≠ . In this case, let V A π− = , and 
so (by definition) V B Sπ− = + . Hence, 
 
( )     U Trading with an uninformed market maker =  
 
( )( ) ( )( )12 log P V B P A V⎡ ⎤+ − + −⎣ ⎦  
( )( ) ( )( )12 log P S Pπ π⎡ ⎤= + + + −⎣ ⎦  
( ) 212 log P P S Sπ π⎡ ⎤= + − −⎣ ⎦  
 
Note that ( )2 0Sπ π− − >  only if ( ) Sπ− > .The probability of this occurring is by 
definition < 1/2. More often than not, ( )2 0Sπ π− − <  and since 214 0S >  the probability 
that ( )2 214S Sπ π− − >  is considerably less than 1/2.  
 
Hence, on average risk-averse uninformed traders will have more utility from trading with 
informed market makers than with uninformed market makers, even if the informed market 
makers have the same spread as uninformed market makers. 
